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THE NEW (PROPOSED?) BANKRUPTCY ACT:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS STRUCTURAL
PROVISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE
INTERESTS OF CONSUMER-DEBTORS
Samuel J.M. Donnelly*
INTRODUCTION

Law reform is slow work and only for the long winded as
Arthur T. Vanderbilt once remarked.' In October, 1977, when
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives withdrew the proposed bankruptcy act from consideration on the
floor, 2 its sponsors must have had a new awareness of this now
ancient saying. The recent passage (February 1, 1978) by the
House of its committee's bill without the Danielson-Railsback
amendment 3 may indicate that the long campaign is near its
close. A brief glance at the proposed act's historical evolution
will illustrate the duration of the law reform's effort.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States made its report in 1973. During the ninety-fourth Congress the appropriate subcommittees of the Senate' and House
of Representatives completed their hearings. In the ninetyfifth, the present Congress, a substantially new bill, resembling
in some respects the Commission bill, was introduced.' Hereaf* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; A.B., 1956, Fordham
University; LL.B., 1960, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1967, New York University
School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Michele Felice and Bruce McKechnie for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. "Manifestly, judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded or for lawyers who
are afraid of temporary defeat." A. VANDERBILT, INTRODUCTION TO MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION XiX (1949).
2. See 123 CONG. REc. H11783 (daily

ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
3. See 124 CONG. Rac. H457-58, H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978).
4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearingson S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
5. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
6. Since 1800 there have been several federal legislative efforts to regulate the
field of bankruptcy in the United States. For a concise history of bankruptcy law up
to 1973, see Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226
(1976).

Beginning in 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
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ter it will be referred to as the House version of the bankruptcy
act. It was this bill which the Judiciary Committee withdrew
and which has now been passed by the House.7
The purpose of this article is to compare some structural
provisions of the House version, which apparently will be the
basis for the new law when eventually passed, with the bill
proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission.' The Senate version,' which was introduced on October 31, 1977, substantially
resembles the House version. There are, however, some significant variations in the Senate bill which will provide an occasional basis for comparison with the solutions to recurrent
problems proposed by the Commission and the House. The
provisions selected for comment are those which potentially
affect the interests of consumers. 0 It will be argued that some
(Commission) delivered to Congress a report which proposed a complete revision of the
present bankruptcy act. See COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission introduced
H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), which later became H.R. 31 and
S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Commission Bill]. In addition
to the Commission bill, bills drafted by both the bankruptcy judges and Congressmen
Edwards and Butler were introduced to Congress. The judges introduced H.R. 16643
and S. 4060, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which later became H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Congressmen Edwards and Butler introduced H.R. 6, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6].
Both the Commission bill and the bill proposed by the bankruptcy judges were
rejected in favor of Congressman Edwards' H.R. 6. This action produced an interim
bill, H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), from which was derived the present bill,
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Bill]. See generally
Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAW. 489 (1978).
7. See 124 CONG. REC. H457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978).
In addition to the withdrawal of the Danielson-Railsback amendment, three
amendments in the nature of substitutions were made to the House bill: the first
prohibits federally insured student loans from being discharged through bankruptcy
for a period of 5 years after the loan becomes due, except in hardship cases; the second
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to determine whether automatic termination of
a license is required when the licensee is discharged in bankruptcy; and the third
shortens from 14 to 7 years the time a bankruptcy may be carried on a credit report.
8. It is important to note that the House version was the product of California
Congressman Don Edwards' efforts. It is therefore appropriate that an analysis of his
bill should appear in the Santa Clara Law Review.
9. On October 28, 1977, H.R. 8200 was withdrawn. On October 31, 1977, a parallel and substantially similar bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 2266, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Bill].
The House bill was withdrawn because its sponsors found the provisions for the
structure of bankruptcy courts, added by amendment on the floor, unacceptable. See
123 CONG. REC. H11763, H11782 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
The Senate bill in title II, section 771 and other sections contain provisions regarding judges similar to those that the House sponsors found objectionable.
10. Although this article focuses on the impact of the bankruptcy proposals on
the consumer-debtor, an alternative approach is to examine the problems bankruptcy
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of the substantive changes are beneficial while others are contrary to the interests of consumer-debtors. Indeed, in regard to
some aspects of the proposed bankruptcy law, consumer advocates who often admire instantaneous reform may prefer careful consideration and long thought. A second purpose for the
article is to provide a basis both for examining the legislative
history of the proposed law and for critiquing the process by
which its provisions are being settled.
As a working premise it is granted that a result adverse to
consumer-debtors may nevertheless serve more general public
interests. Consumers, however, are largely unorganized individuals who as debtors establish relations with a number of
organizations both private and governmental. One could argue,
then, that the consumer-debtor stands in a position where he
is the least able of the contending forces to protect his interests
during the process leading to enactment of the proposed law
and after its effective date. For this reason, it may be sensible
to be peculiarly concerned with the impact of the proposed
changes on the interest of the consumer-debtor."' In the instance of provisions which are contrary to the consumer interposes to the consumer-creditor. All too many times the consumer purchases goods on
a lay-away basis and expends substantial amounts of money in expectation of receiving
the goods upon final payment only to find that he cannot take possession of the goods
nor can he recover the money expended due to the intervention of bankruptcy. These
consumers "find themselves without remedy when the business with whom they are
dealing applies for formal insolvency relief .... " House Hearings, supra note 5, at
1700 (statement of Elinor C. Guggenheimer). The problem is exacerbated by the fact
that "[miany of these consumers fall into low and moderate income brackets-for it
is these people who can only afford to purchase goods and services on a layaway basis.
It is also the poor who are more likely to deal with unstable businesses in marginal
neighborhoods, the type of businesses which are most likely to fail." Id. A further
problem arises because of the low priority status given to these consumer creditors as
opposed to the priorities given to federal taxes and secured creditors.
A possible solution to these problems would be to give specific sanction to elevating the consumer creditor to the status of a secured creditor with a lien on the assets
of the business. It should be noted that during the House debate Massachusetts Congressman Drinan proposed an amendment that would place consumer-creditors on
equal footing with judgment lien creditors. 123 CONG. REc. H11733 (daily ed. Oct. 28,
1977).
In a different context, bankruptcy poses another problem to the consumercreditor, i.e., wages lost to his bankrupt employer. Although this problem is somewhat
alleviated by § 4405(a)(3) of the Commission bill, which protects the worker's wages
for 3 months after the failure of the employer to pay them, it has been suggested that
the time period be extended in order to embrace not only total failure to pay but
partial payment as well. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2429 (statement of Max
Zimay).
Although beyond the scope of this article, these consumer-creditor problems merit
the careful attention and concern of consumer advocates.
11. Compare this approach with J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 75 (1972).
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est one can locate and predict the adverse impact. These provisions, if passed, can then be watched in practice to determine
whether the adverse impact has occurred. If experience, including empirical research, supports the predication, there would
be a basis for further changes in the bankruptcy law." In addition, exploring the impact of the new law on consumer interests
will provide a vantage point for examining its structural provisions and for critiquing the process which led to their inclusion. 3
To determine how seriously consumer interests are affected either favorably or unfavorably, one must first form
some notion of what consumers should seek or fear from a
bankruptcy proceeding.
An examination of the structure of bankruptcy law may
help in identifying the principal concerns which consumerdebtors should have. A straight bankruptcy may be voluntary
or involuntary. Under its basic theory and structure all of the
bankrupt debtor's property, with some exceptions such as exempt or abandoned property, is collected and distributed to
creditors; in exchange the bankrupt, again with some exceptions, will receive a discharge from all of his debts. In a wage
earner's proceeding the debtor may retain his property but
must submit his future income to the control of the court as one
factor in the arrangement which he will propose to his creditors. In straight bankruptcy the debtor's future income is unaffected by the proceedings. What a consumer should seek or fear
from a bankruptcy proceeding will be related primarily to these
structural features of bankruptcy law. From voluntary bankruptcy a consumer should want a discharge. In addition, he
will normally want to retain a maximum amount of property.
In order to increase the property retained or to achieve other
goals, a consumer may choose to submit his future income to
the control of the court in a wage earners' proceeding. Usually
a consumer will find an involuntary bankruptcy undesirable
and will fear its use by creditors if such use appears possible.
An involuntary wage earners' proceeding would appear more
threatening because the consumer's income will be affected for
12. In fact, drafts of this article have been forwarded to both Senate and House
subcommittees in the hope that changes may be made prior to enactment.
13. Indeed, viewing proposed legislation from the vantage point of those who are
least able to protect their interests provides a method, less complex than a complete
interest analysis, of readily ascertaining the value of the legislation to segments of
society which are affected by it. See J. RAwLS, supra note 11, at 319.
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a period of time.
These structural features of bankruptcy law point to the
basic interests of the consumer-debtor which are affected by
bankruptcy. One concerned with these interests should examine any proposed changes in bankruptcy law to determine the
manner in which they are affected by provisions related to the
structural features of bankruptcy. It is arguable that provisions
not so related affect the consumer-debtor only peripherally. If
such provisions are favorable to the consumer, one might raise
the possibility that they are window dressing.
The discussion in this article will be organized around the
structural features of bankruptcy law which will be grouped
under the three stages of a bankruptcy proceeding: the initiation of a voluntary or involuntary proceeding, the collection of
the estate, and the distribution and discharge. The provisions
of the Commission bill, the recently passed House version, and
the current law will be compared to assess their impact on the
basic interests of the consumer-debtor. In addition, the Senate
bill will be commented upon when its provisions affecting
consumer-debtors differ from those of the House. Since the
structural features of bankruptcy are often interrelated, it will
be necessary to discuss, under one heading, provisions which
will be analyzed at greater length in another part.
INITIATION OF A BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING

Involuntary Bankruptcy
Historically bankruptcy was a creditors' remedy. Only recently in Anglo-American legal history have debtors been allowed discharges or been permitted voluntary bankruptcy.
However, periodically during the nineteenth century there was
a popular demand for enactment of a bankruptcy law as a
debtor relief measure. These laws were usually short lived.
When Congress was debating the present bankruptcy act before passing it in 1898, two forces were in contention; southern
and western populists represented the interests of debtors while
a number of easterners supported the financial interests. The
populists who sought enactment of a bankruptcy law to protect
debtors were concerned with the dangers of involuntary bankruptcy. For example, Representative Lewis of Georgia declared: "Involuntary bankruptcy is a weapon in the hands of
the creditor to press collections of debt harshly, to intimidate
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and to destroy."' 4 Representative Sparkman of Florida argued
that involuntary bankruptcy was "an engine of oppression"' 5
"intended to bind hand and foot the debtors of this country and
place them in the vise like grip of the greedy cormorants."'"
The present statute, with its requirement that three creditors
file an involuntary petition where there are twelve or more
creditors 7 and that the petition allege an act of bankruptcy, 8
was the outcome of a compromise between "those who wanted
to give the creditor an effective remedy to assure equal distribution of a bankrupt's assets and those who were determined
to protect the debtor from the harassment of ill-considered or
oppressive involuntary petitions, including those by a single
creditor interest.""9
Arguably, the Congress which passed the present act intended that the number of involuntary bankruptcies would be
limited. That, of course, is the impact of the provisions which
it enacted. For example, during the year ending in June, 1975,
there were 1,266 involuntary straight bankruptcies commenced
but 208,064 voluntary straight bankruptcies."0 The provisions
14. 31 CONG. REc. 1803 (1898).
15. Id. at 1851.
16. Id. at 1908.
17. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 59, 11 U.S.C. § 95 (1970).
18. Id. § 3, 11 U.S.C. §21 (1970).
19. In re Gilbraltor Amusements, Ltd., 291 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly,
J., dissenting).
20. The Bankruptcy Commission noted that the number of bankruptcies in the
United States increased by more than 1000% over the past 20 years. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. The following table generally indicates the activity in the
number of voluntary and involuntary straight bankruptcies since 1946 with the last
column showing the activity in the number of consumer bankruptcies.
YEAR
1946
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

VOLUNTARY

INVOLUNTARY

CONSUMER**

8,293
25,263
47,650
50,655
60,335
76,048
85,502
94,414
124,386
122,499
128,405
141,828
149,820
161,840
173,884

268
1,369
1,249
1,240
1,189
1,417
1,288
1,296
1,444
1,382
1,409
1,339
1,317
1,173
1,241

8,566
n.a.*
n.a.*
52,608
63,617
80,264
88,943
97,750
131,402
132,125
139,191
155,209
163,413
175,924
191,729

NEW BANKRUPTCY ACT

19781

of section 32! of the present law, which describe the acts of
bankruptcy, are complex, confusing, and poorly drafted. From
these provisions, however, one can trace the general circumstances under which a debtor now may be adjudicated a bankrupt without his consent. Normally the debtor must be insolvent according to a balance sheet test under which his liabilities would exceed his assets. In addition, there must be some
indication that creditors are beginning to divide the debtor's
assets and hence a need for the orderly collection and distribution of assets under the supervision of a federal bankruptcy
court. Preferential transfers, fraudulent transfers, and liens are
among the signals for involuntary bankruptcy. These are stern
requirements, arguably designed to restrict the number of involuntary bankruptcies.
However, the present bankruptcy act is far from entirely
debtor oriented. In addition to providing for debtor rehabilitation, the present law serves the purpose of providing an orderly
method for collection and distribution of property to creditors.
A number of provisions, including those concerning false financial statements, have a very harsh impact on debtors. 2
The Bankruptcy Commission has expressed the opinion
that it is too difficult to establish the grounds for an involuntary bankruptcy. As a result some involuntary petitions are
filed too late in the collapse of a business to save assets for
creditors.Y In response to this perceived problem, the Commission bill made the task of establishing the grounds for involuntary bankruptcy much easier. One may find the provisions governing the initiation of involuntary proceedings in Chapter IV,
164,592
154,054
161,366
167,149
152,840
144,929
156,962
208,064

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

1,001
946
1,085
1,215
1,094
985
1,009
1,266

181,266
169,500
178,202
182,249
164,737
155,707
168,767
224,354

*Includes Ch. 13, wage earners' proceedings.
**Not Available.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics
(1975).
21. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
22. See notes 150-158 and accompanying text infra.

23.

COMMISSION REPORT,

24. Id.

supra note 6, at 14.
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Part 2 which is entitled "Commencement of Relief." Under its
provisions one creditor with a claim of $2,500 may file a petition seeking involuntary straight bankruptcy.25 Under the
Commission bill this would be a Chapter V proceeding. 8 One
creditor with a claim of $10,000 may file a petition for an involuntary corporate reorganization.27 Chapter VII of the Commission bill which would govern reorganizations is a merger of
Chapters X, XI, and XII of the present law. Unlike the present
law which requires allegation of an act of bankruptcy, an involuntary Chapter V or VII petition need only allege that "the
debtor will be generally unable to pay his current liabilities as
they become due"2 8 or that "the debtor has generally failed to
pay his debts as they become due." 29 The principal check on
filing involuntary petitions against individuals or corporations
is a requirement that the "petitioner shall have the burden of
proving that relief is in the best interests of the debtor and its
creditors.

30

The court may require the petitioner to file a bond

and in some instances upon dismissal of a case, the court may
grant damages and attorney's fees to the debtor.3 '
The Commission substituted tests which generally resemble the common law liquidity concept of insolvency for the
balance sheet (liabilities exceed assets) standard of the present
bankruptcy act. In place of some indication that the debtor's
assets are being dissipated the Commission has asked the
bankruptcy judge in his dis6retion to determine whether bankruptcy is in the "best interests of the debtor and its credi"tors."2 A variety of considerations may be relevant in making
that determination. Among them would be a comparison of the
amount which creditors would realize in a bankruptcy liquidation with the likelihood of payment outside of bankruptcy,33 the
25. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-205(a).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 4.205(b).
28. Id. § 4-205(c)(1).
29. Id. § 4-205(c)(2).
30. Id. § 4-208(a).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Under the present act, in arrangement proceedings under Chapters XI and
XII, and in wage earners' plans under Chapter XIII, the court shall confirm a plan if
it is satisfied that the plan "is for the best interests of the creditors and is feasible" in
cases where one or more classes have dissented against the plan. See Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, §§ 366(2), 472(2), 656(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 766(2), 872(2), 1056(2) (1970). For
example, where the dissenting creditors would fare better in liquidating the estate
rather than in accepting the proposed arrangement, a court would likely find that the
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probability that the debtor would be rehabilitated,34 and indications that the debtor's estate is being dissipated or divided
piecemeal among creditors. 5 The weight given to any particular consideration appears to rest in the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Indeed, the bankruptcy judge also is provided
extensive leeway by the insolvency standards which are described as the "basis for relief." In determining whether a
debtor "will be generally unable to pay his current liabilities
as they become due," one could compare his flow of income and
his liquid assets with his monthly bills; but one might ask
whether it is as easy to determine when a debtor "has generally
failed to pay his debts as they become due."" Questions such
as what percentage of debts must remain unpaid and during
what period of time appear relevant. The bankruptcy judges
would provide the answers to these questions under the Commission bill. A major theme of these provisions is that the
circumstances under which debtors may be adjudicated bankrupt without their consent is left to the discretion of the judge.
Recognizing that a single creditor owed $2,500 may appeal
to the judge's discretion, one must conclude that the number
of involuntary bankruptcies would increase under the Commission bill. 7 Whether, contrary to the compromise of 1898, involarrangement was not in the best interests of the creditors and deny confirmation of
the plan. Although framed in the context of arrangement proceedings, these provisions
would serve as useful standards by which the bankruptcy judge could determine
whether to allow the involuntary bankruptcy to proceed.
34. For example, in cases where there is no hope of rehabilitating the debtor
because of his poor financial prospects for accumulating future wealth, i.e., for getting
a job, the judge should not permit the involuntary proceeding to commence since this
would seriously infringe the rehabilitation purpose of the bankruptcy act.
35. Under the present act, § 3 lists the "acts of bankruptcy" necessary to
initiate an involuntary straight bankruptcy. These acts of bankruptcy are statutory
indications of the presence of "grab law," the dissipation of the debtor's estate in a
manner unfair to all the creditors. The bankruptcy judge, under the proposed law,
would be advised to look to the old "acts of bankruptcy" as standards by which to
determine the presence of grab law. If grab law is present, the judge would likely find
that the involuntary bankruptcy is in the best interests of the debtor and its creditors.
36. "It would require the wisdom of Solomon, indeed, to determine upon an
objective test to ascertain whether a debtor 'will be generally unable to pay ....
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1670 (statement of Richard Kaufman).
37. With respect to the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings whether for liquidation under Chapter V of either bill or for the
reorganization of a business entity under Chapter VII of the Commission's Bill and VII and VIII of the Judge's bill, the ABA (American Bankers Association) believes that the filing of a petition has been made too
easy by permitting one creditor holding a claim of $2,500 or more to file
a petition seeking liquidation or by permitting one creditor with a claim
of $10,000 or more to file a petition seeking business reorganization.
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untary bankruptcy would become "a weapon in the hands of
the creditor to press collections of debt harshly"3 if the Commission bill were adopted would depend initially upon the prevailing approach within the various circuits.
The House version in its Chapter 3 makes it somewhat
more difficult to have a debtor adjudicated a bankrupt without
his consent. If there are twelve or more creditors, then three
who are owed at least $5,000 above the value of any security
are required to file a petition for an involuntary case.3" When
there are less than twelve creditors, one who is owed $5,000 may
file an involuntary petition.'" The court may either dismiss a
case or suspend all proceedings at any time if "the interests of
creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension."" The court may require the posting of
a bond 2 and in some circumstances, upon dismissing an involuntary petition, the court may award the debtor costs, reasonable attorney's fees and damages. 3
The principal tools used by those who drafted the House
version to make it more difficult to file an involuntary petition
are the added number of creditors and the increased amount
of debt owed over the value of any security. The change back
to the requirement that three creditors file an involuntary petition will reduce the possibility that debtors will be harassed by
one angry creditor with threats of involuntary bankruptcy."
Granting a single creditor the right to initiate proceeding gives to such
creditor leverage that will often result either in preferential payments
being made to such creditor or in a substantial increase in the number of
bankruptcies. Three petitioning creditors should be required for either a
liquidation or a reorganization petition.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1748 (statement of Robert J. Grimmig).
38. H.R. 6, supra note 6, § 303(i)(1).
39. House Bill, supra note 6, § 303(b)(1).
40. Id.§ 303(b)(2).
41. Id.§ 305(a)(1).
42. Id.§ 303(e).
43. Id.§ 303(i)(1).
44. The National Association of Credit Management recommends:
That the provision permitting only a single petitioning creditor would
provide for "spiteful" involuntary petitions, or those prompted by competitive reasons.
The Association [National Association of Credit Managementi believes that a competitor might even go so far as to "acquire" a claim
against a company which is troublesome competitively, even though insolvent, then use this claim to file an involuntary petition. Even if the
petition were successfully defended by the alleged bankrupt, . . . irreparable damage may have been done to the company's image among its
suppliers and customers.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1670 (statement of Richard Kaufman).
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However, it should not be difficult for the normal institutional
creditors in a community to develop common policies in regard
to bankruptcy. When those policies indicate that bankruptcy
should be used as a collection device, it will be relatively easy
to find the necessary number of creditors. In addition, one
should note that consumer-debtors are more likely than other
potential bankrupts to have less than twelve creditors. While
the change to three creditors is very desirable, the increase in
the amount of debt is more important to consumers. Large
segments of poorer consumers will be insulated from threats of
involuntary bankruptcy by this change. However, the House
version will leave substantial numbers in the middle income
class subject to involuntary bankruptcy. A normal line of credit
for those in the middle income ranges is $5,000. The bank extending a line of credit, when joined by two credit card issuers,
would be able to use involuntary bankruptcy regularly as a tool
for policing their arrangements with debtors.
Under the House version the court normally may order
relief in an involuntary case only when "the debtor is generally
unable to pay such debtor's debts as such debts become due. ' 4
This single liquidity test for insolvency restricts the court's
discretion somewhat more than the dual test found in the Commission bill. The court still has considerable discretion in determining whether to dismiss a case when the interests of creditors and the debtor "would be better served by such dismissal."" It is not clear that this standard differs from the one
found in the Commission bill.
Congress could use a variety of tools short of return to the
provisions of the present law to restrict the use of involuntary
bankruptcy against consumer-debtors more strongly than either the Commission bill or the House version. An increase in
the amount of debt required to be held by the filing creditors
to $10,000 above the value of any security would protect most
middle income consumers. This figure would be above the
usual line of credit and accumulation of debts under credit
cards. A middle income consumer who owed this amount and
was insolvent under a liquidity test would be in severe financial
difficulty. One who owed $5,000 might be a normal middle
45. House Bill, supra note 6, § 303(h)(1).
46. Id. § 305(a)(1). See also id. § 305(c). Section 305 provides that the decision
to dismiss or not dismiss is unreviewable. Query what relationship a reviewing court
would find between this provision and section 707 which provides that the court may
dismiss a straight bankruptcy only for cause?
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income consumer experiencing some temporary difficulties
perhaps due to seasonal employment or a layoff caused by a
natural gas shortage.
Using a second tool to restrict involuntary bankruptcy,
Congress could exclude "individuals with regular income" as
defined in section 1-102(28)"' of the Commission bill or section
101(23) of the House version from those subject to involuntary
bankruptcy. This would include those whose principal income
is from wages, salaries, commissions, and the like. An exemption such as this could be inserted in section 4-204 of the Commission bill or in section 303(a) of the House version. 48 Such a
provision would not be unprecedented since both bills now exempt farmers and the present law exempts wage earners who
make less that $1,500 a year."9 In 1898, when the present law
was first enacted, and in 1938, when it was substantially re47. 'Individual with regular income' means an individual whose
principal regular income is derived from wages, salary, commissions, retirement benefits, welfare payments, or any other similar source with
sufficient regularity and stability that periodical payments of a fixed
amount to his creditors pursuant to a plan under Chapter VI is feasible.
Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 1-102(28).
An exemption such as this could be inserted in section 4-204 of the Commission
bill or in section 303(a) of the House bill.
48. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 851-52 (testimony of Samuel J. M.
Donnelly). For example, section 4-204 could be amended to read:
Any person eligible to file a voluntary petition under Section 4-201
except an individual who earns more than half of his gross income from
farming, an individual who owes $10,000 or less above the value of any
property subject to a mortgage or security interest, or a corporation which
owes $20,000 or less above the value of any property subject to a mortgage
or security interest shall be subject to an involuntary petition under this
chapter.
This amendment would prevent creditors from filing involuntary petitions against
individuals and small businesses whose debts are not large. Restricting the availability
of involuntary bankruptcy by such an amendment would also serve to protect the
availability of credit, and thus, keep the cost of credit low, to those small corporations
which are in their young, debt-producing years. Such an amendment may also protect
these small corporations from a brutal form of tender offer from a larger corporation.
Without this protection, large corporations could initiate involuntary bankruptcies on
the corporations to which they plan to make tender offers. A small, young corporation
faced with such a dilemma may easily succumb to such pressure and accept the tender
offer as the only way out. Indeed, large corporations may not be the only threat to such
young corporations. The Mafia and similar criminal underworld organizations may
find involuntary bankruptcy an extremely persuasive tool with which to convince the
defenseless corporation to seek their protection for a fee.
49. Section 4 of the present bankruptcy act exempts both wage earners and
farmers. 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). However, wage earner is defined under section 1(32)
as "an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not
exceeding $1,500 per year." Id. § 1(32) (1970).
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vised, the exemption for wage earners was meaningful. But
inflation since 1938 has made that exemption meaningless to
almost all wage earners. To continue that exemption and insulate it against inflation with a cost of living escalator would be
in accord with the original scheme of the bankruptcy law and
would be the clearest indication that Congress does not intend
to permit harassment of low and middle income consumerdebtors by threats of involuntary bankruptcy. If the new bankruptcy law is enacted without these changes and the number
of involuntary consumer bankruptcies becomes undesirably
large, then Congress should make the changes in subsequent
years.
Further, Congress could restrict the court's discretion by
providing a more precise definition of the insolvency necessary
for an involuntary bankruptcy. ° For example, in section
303(h)(1) of the House version, the words "the debtor is generally unable to pay such debtor's debts as such debts become
due" could be dropped in favor of such language as "the debtor
during the preceeding three months has failed to pay a major
part of his debts as they became due." This would substitute
actual failure to pay for speculation regarding inability to pay.
It would specify a large portion of the debts rather than allow
the possibility that inability to pay some debts would be a
ground for bankruptcy. It would also specify a period of time
when the failure to pay would occur. However, this amendment, standing by itself without some explicit exemption for
individuals earning regular income or for those owing less than
some high fixed amount, would leave the number of involuntary consumer bankruptcies to the discretion of courts, because
individual judges would still be left to determine when these
would be in the best interests of the debtor and his creditors.
Section 303(h)(1) of the newly published Senate version of
the bankruptcy bill offers an even more precise definition of
insolvency than the House bill. A court may order involuntary
relief against a debtor if "the debtor is generally unable to pay
or has failed to pay a major portion of his debts as such debts
50. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 851. Among the recommended changes to
the Commission bill are deleting section 4-205(c)(1) and amending section 4-205(c)(2)
to read, "if the debtor during the preceding 3 months has failed to pay a major part of
his debts as they become due." These changes would make the language of section 4205(c) more specific and would restrict the discretion of bankruptcy judges. Furthermore, the 3 month period is parallel to periods stated in the avoidance and collection
of the estate provisions. See, e.g., Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-607.
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become due."'" While it could be contended that the addition
of the word "major" adds little to the word "generally," it
appears to be designed to prevent courts from declaring debtors
bankrupt without their consent, when only a small portion of
their debts are generally not paid. Even under this standard,
courts will be left to determine the time during which the failure to pay will lead to involuntary bankruptcy. Thus, though
the Senate version takes a step towards protecting consumerdebtors from involuntary bankruptcy, it still leaves many questions to be settled by the courts.
The Impact of Exemption Provisions on the Number of
Involuntary Bankruptcies
While some creditors would use any likely tool to harass
those who owe them money, most creditors would use involuntary bankruptcy only if they perceive some monetary advantage from the proceedings themselves as opposed to their use
as a threat. It is arguable that the exemption provisions of the
Commission bill provide creditors in many instances with the
monetary incentive to employ involuntary straight bankruptcy
as a normal part of their collection process.
Unlike section 6 of the present law, which applies state
exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings,52 the Commission bill
provides for a number of specific exemptions53 in bankruptcy
and would not refer to state law on this point." The Commission's exemption provisions appear to be a modernized restate51. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 303(h)(1).
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) provides:
This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they
have had their domicile for the 6 months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition . . ..
53. Specific exemptions included in section 4-503 of the Commission bill are as
follows: (1) an aggregate of $1,000 worth of livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles; (2) a burial plot
of $2,500; (3) cash or its equivalent of $500 (including a tax refund); (4) alimony and
support; (5) life insurance proceeds or benefits derived from insurance on the life of a
spouse or provide; (6) retirement benefits under a plan qualified pursuant to Internal
Revenue Code section 401(a) or established by statute and limited to what is reasonably necessary for support; (7) disability benefits; (8) personal injury or unemployment
benefits; (9) health aides; and (10) cash surrender value in insurance up to $1,500. If
the debtor dies, a family allowance of up to $1,000 per person is provided for in section
4-503(e). Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of the Bankruptcy Commission).
54. Id. at 25 (statement of Frank Kennedy).
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ment of existing state statutes.5 A principal exemption is for
the homestead of the debtor in the amount of $5,000 plus $500
for each dependent" of the debtor. Debtors without a homestead may use this sum to increase the amount of certain other
property which may be retained. There are a number of other
specific exemptions, including a list of "other property" such
as livestock, wearing apparel, household furnishings, cash, se55. Much discussion in the Senate Hearings was devoted to whether there should
be a federal floor for exemptions similar to federal limitations on garnishment, see 15
U.S.C. § 1671 (1970), and whether there should be a federal uniform exemption law
or whether the diversity among state exemption statutes should be preserved. Mr.
Charles Seligson, member of the Commission noted several inconsistencies among
state exemption statutes: New York exempts 10% of wages in addition to whatever
amount is necessary to maintain the bankrupt; Pennsylvania exempts all wages as
does North Carolina and other states; similarly Texas exempts real estate with all
improvements which conceivably could be worth "hundreds of thousands of dollars."
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 29. Mr. Seligson further noted:
We recognized that if we

. .

. had the uniform exemption in bankruptcy,

it might change the situation in regard to filing or nonfiling of petitions,
depending upon the State where the debtor had his domicile.
I do believe, I think we have got to face up to the fact that when you
talk about exemptions you are talking about something that seems to be
very close to the hearts of those who administer State governments, states
rights, and that does present a problem.
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 29-30. Although Mr. Seligson opposed a uniform
exemption statute he felt favorable to imposing a federal floor above which states
would grant more liberal exemptions. Id. at 30; see House Hearings, supra note 5, at
359 (statement of Prof. Countryman, Harvard Law School); accord, M. GIRTH & D.
STANLEY, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM-PROCESS-REFORM

384 (1971). Mr. Walter W.

Vaughn, speaking on behalf of the American Bankers Association echoed Mr. Seligson's view and noted: "Under the consumer protection acts passed by Congress in
recent years there has always been provision for state laws providing the consumer with
protection beyond that which was granted in the federal statute. We see no reason why
this approach should not be taken in the case of exemptions." Senate Hearings, supra
note 4, at 128; see id. at 309 (statement of Richard A. Hesse, consultant, Nat'l Consumer Law Center). But see House Hearings, supra note 5 at 1368-69 (statement of
Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Nat'l Consumer Fin. Ass'n).
Discussion in the House Hearings also pointed to the inconsistencies among states'
exemption statutes. Mr. Richard A. Lavine, representing the Department of Justice
before the House Hearings, testified that:
We agree fully with the Commission on the bankruptcy laws that the
archaic and widely varying state exemption laws for individual debtors
should no longer be applied in bankruptcy proceedings. The exemption
laws of some States make those States a debtor's paradise. Debtors
should not be favored in bankruptcy depending upon their choice as such
a State of residence or the accident of their residence there.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2140. But see id. at 1663-64 (statement of L.E. Creel
III).
56. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(b)(1). Mr. Richard A. Levine, representing the Department of Justice, stated that there was a need for a definition of
'dependent' in the statute to promote certainty and avoid widely differing treatment
in different jurisdictions." House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2117.
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curities and income tax refunds." The amount of "other property" which may be retained is often subject to monetary limitations.
The homestead exemption found in the Commission bill
provides the clearest incentive to creditors in some states to use
involuntary bankruptcy as a normal means of collection." The
amount of the exemption is considerably below that found in
the homestead exemption laws of a number of states including,
for example, California where it is currently fixed at $30,000 for
a head of household and any person over sixty-five. 5 Creditors
in those states would have a strong incentive to use involuntary
bankruptcy against debtors claiming homestead exemptions. If
the Commission bill were enacted, some states might in response reduce their homestead exemptions to eliminate that
incentive, but state legislatures perhaps would decide against
this course or would have more pressing matters to consider.
In contrast, the amount of the exemption is lower than
$5,000 in some states including New York where it is now set
at $2,000 (recently increased to $10,000).1 o In these states the
Commission bill establishes a reason for creditors not to pursue
involuntary bankruptcy. However, some debtors would have an
additional reason for seeking the relief of bankruptcy.
One may find a similar but more limited impact for other
exemption provisions in the Commission bill. If the amount of
the exemption found in state law is higher or lower than the
proposed federal provision there would be an incentive for
using bankruptcy or a reason for avoiding it. If an exemption
found in state law, such as the California exemption for fishing
boats,9 ' is not repeated in federal law, some creditors would
have a reason for using bankruptcy against some debtors.
While the present act is not uniform because it incorporates non-uniform state exemptions, the Commission bill,
though adopting uniform exemptions, would still not achieve
uniformity because the rate of involuntary and voluntary bankruptcies would fluctuate widely depending on whether state
exemption laws favor or disfavor certain categories of debtors.
57. For other exemptions, see note 53 supra.
58. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 309 (statement of Richard A. Hesse,
consultant, Nat'l Consumer Law Center).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1977).
60. For examples of state exemptions statutes, see note 55 supra.
61. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 690.4 (West Supp. 1977). Note, however, that the
maximum amount is $2,500.
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Whether the Commission bill favors consumer debtors or would
be a weapon to press debt collections would depend upon the
state in which the consumer lives.
A single provision in the House version corrects substantially the difficulties just described. Under section 522(b) a
bankrupt debtor may choose between the federal exemption
provisions and those of his state. The federal provisions then
would become a floor but not a ceiling on the amount of property which a debtor could retain."2 The exemption provisions
would provide little incentive to creditors to use involuntary
bankruptcy although in some states debtors would have a reason for filing voluntary petitions.
The pattern of the specific exemption provisions of the
House version resembles that of the Commission bill, although
amounts and specific items differ. An important difference is
found in the amount of the homestead exemption. A flat
amount of $10,000 is found in the House version 3 in contrast
to the $5,000 plus $500 for each dependent listed in the Commission bill. 4 In states with a lower homestead exemption such
as New York 5 some creditors will have to have a very substantial reason for using involuntary bankruptcy; some debtors in
those states will have a strong reason for voluntary bankruptcy.
The amount of the homestead exemption must be considered in determining the class of debtors against whom involuntary bankruptcy would be used. Normally creditors would not
use involuntary bankruptcy against debtors who have no significant assets which are not exempt. Since the principal asset of
many consumer-debtors is a home, the amount of the homestead exemption must be considered in determining which
debtors would be substantially immune from involuntary
bankruptcy. Under the House version, those with less than
$10,000 equity in their homes and no other significant nonexempt assets would be in this category. This would tend to limit
the use of involuntary bankruptcy against middle income
consumer-debtors. In states with high homestead exemptions
62. See note 55 supra. The new Senate version does away with the choice of
exemptions available to the debtor. In it the debtor may only use his state exemptions
and there is no longer a provision for a federal minimum exemption as under the House
version. Senate Bill, supra note 9, §522(b). This will be detrimental to some consumerdebtors but will provide creditors with no incentive to use bankrutcy to avoid state
exemption provisions.
63. House Bill, supra note 6, § 522(d)(1).
64. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(b)(1).
65. See note 55 supra.
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that limitation would be greater. However, elderly middle
income consumer-debtors would tend to be more vulnerable to
involuntary bankruptcy in all states than younger persons with
the same income because of the likelihood that the equity in
their homes is greater. The possibility of large debts due to
illness and medical expenses would increase the probability
that involuntary bankruptcy would be used against some elderly debtors. While the House version affords greater protection
to consumer-debtors than the Commission bill, there is an incentive under it for some creditors to use involuntary bankruptcy as a "weapon . . .to press collections of debt harshly""6
against some debtors, including the elderly who own their
homes .
The Senate version, if enacted, would entirely eliminate
the proposed federal minimum exemption provisions 8 and retain the present reliance on state law regarding exemptions.
For this reason, it would place fewer restraints on the use of
involuntary bankruptcy against middle income consumerdebtors. In states with low homestead exemptions, for example, bankruptcy would afford a remedy against debtors with
substantial equity in their homes.
The Incentive to Use Involuntary Bankruptcy to Encourage
Pursuit of Wage Earners' Proceedings
While encouraging use of its proposed Chapter VI and
making it more attractive to debtors than the present Chapter
XIII, the Commission has rejected proposals for involuntary
wage earner arrangement proceedings." However, the Commis66. See 31 CONG. REc. 1803 (1898).
67. Any household exemption which is limited to a certain equity value will leave
the elderly more vulnerable since they are likely to have a higher equity in their home.
68. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 522(b); see note 62 supra.
69. Professor Vern Countryman of Harvard Law School opposed involuntary
wage earners' proceedings on three grounds:
(1) Compulsory wage earner plans would be inconsistent with the policy
and traditions of a country which has abolished involuntary servitude by
the Thirteenth Amendment to its federal Constitution, has abolished
peonage, or debt slavery, by federal statute. . . and has abolished all but
a few vestiges of imprisonment for debt by state constitutions and statutes.
(2) We expressed the view compulsory plans for wage earners only
would discriminate against them since no similar proposals were made
for individuals who were not wage earners or for corporations.
(3) As a practical matter, compulsory wage earners plans would not
work.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1410.
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sion bill would make it possible for creditors, with the cooperation of bankruptcy judges, to strongly influence wage earners
to use Chapter VI arrangement proceedings.
A creditor would be able to accomplish this goal by filing
a petition for involuntary bankruptcy alleging that the debtor
has generally been or would generally be unable to pay his
debts as they mature. A bankruptcy judge who is so inclined
would then use his discretion to dismiss the petition as not "in
the best interest of the debtor and its creditors" provided the
debtor would file a Chapter VI petition. The court could then
direct relief under Chapter VI rather than straight bankruptcy
at the debtor's request. The great discretion given to bankruptcy judges by the general language of the involuntary bankruptcy provisions would allow those who favor Chapter VI proceedings to cooperate with creditors to force employment of
these proceedings under threat of involuntary straight bankruptcy.
Under the present law, voluntary wage earners' proceedings are more frequently used in some parts of our country than
others. For example, in 1974 there were 602 Chapter XIII proceedings in the Second Circuit (546 of which were in the western district of New York), 127 in the Third Circuit, 8,354 in the
0
Fifth Circuit (over 5,000 of which were in Alabama)," 5,542 in
the Sixth Circuit, 1,794 in the Eighth Circuit, and 5,142 in the
Ninth Circuit. 7 The attitude of the bankruptcy judges as well
as the familiarity of lawyers in a jurisdiction with wage earners'
proceedings would encourage or inhibit their use.
70. Bankruptcy Judge, Conrad K. Cyr, speaking on behalf of the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, testified before the Senate Hearings that the
"consistent preference for Chapter XIII over straight bankruptcy" in Alabama is due
to the fact that:
It was in Birmingham, Alabama, during the early years of the Great
Depression, that Referee Valentine Nesbitt devised and implemented the
first "wage earner program" from the 'whole cloth' of the former Section
74, which became the principal model on which Congress relied in fashioning Chapter XIII as part of the Chandler Act of 1938. The program at
Birmingham has developed and consistently remained the largest Chapter XIII program in the nation, both because of its early beginnings and
its widespread community acceptance.
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 73-74.
71. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy
Statistics (1974). The figures for 1975 were 1,318 Chapter XIII proceedings in the
Second Circuit (1,196 of which were in the Western District of New York), 215 in the
Third Circuit, 10,588 in the Fifth Circuit (6,399 of which were in Alabama), 7,094 in
the Sixth Circuit, 2,261 in the Eighth Circuit, and 6,532 in the Ninth Circuit. Id.
(1975).
72. Judge Conrad K. Cyr, testifying before the Senate Hearings on behalf of the
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It is possible that creditors and judges in some parts of our
country would be sufficiently enthusiastic about Chapter VI
proceedings to use the leverage available under the Commission's involuntary straight bankruptcy provisions to encourage
large numbers of debtors in some financial difficulties to use
these proceedings as a means of paying their creditors from
future earnings. The incentive to do so would be greater in
some states than in others. In states such as New York where
creditors may garnish only ten percent of a debtor's wages,
creditors may receive more than this from a wage earners' plan.
This would be a less important reason for encouraging wage
earners' proceedings in states such as California where the
twenty-five percent limitation found in the Federal AntiGarnishment Act is the principal restriction on access to the
debtor's income. Even in such states, however, some creditors
may be compelled to wait their turn for garnishment until creditors with prior garnishments are satisfied." Under a wage
earners' plan there would probably be payments more closely
resembling pro rata distributions. In California and other
states with high garnishment rates, the homestead exemption
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges stated that the lack of uniformity among
the districts' application of Chapter XI was due to several reasons including "the lack
of awareness on the part of debtors and attorneys of the existence of Chapter XII in
some areas; [and] differing social and creditor attitudes toward consumer insolvency
and variations in the attitudes of bankruptcy judges in different parts of the country."
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 52.
In the Southern District of New York, for instance, Judge Cyr indicated that few
Chapter XI's are filed because bankruptcy judges have been preoccupied by the
heavy volume of business cases, complex reorganizations, arrangements and the intricacies of business bankruptcy law. In the fiscal year 1973, one Chapter XIII was
initiated among the 1,197 total cases filed. Said Judge Cyr, "These men are neither
by training nor experience very likely to be promoting a Chapter XIII program in their
area." Id.
In New Hampshire and Vermont there are few Chapter xm cases because their
judges are part time bankruptcy judges which contrasts with Maine where there are
two full time bankruptcy judges and a heavy volume of Chapter XIII cases. In 1973,
no Chapter XIII cases were initiated in 5 districts (Vt., Del., W. Pa., W. Wash. and
E. Okla.).
Judge Cyr testified, however, that the major reason for the inconsistent use of
Chapter XIII is "the lack of any functional consensus among lawyers and bankruptcy
judges generally, district judges as well, as to what the true legislative purpose of
Chapter XIII is." Id.
The fact that it is not economically feasible for some law firms or their clients to
handle Chapter XIII proceedings may be another reason for their lack of widespread
use. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1349-50 (statement of Paul L. Winkler).
73. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 682.3(a)(4) (West 1976), which places a
maximum limit of 90 days for garnishments giving other creditors a chance to obtain
garnishments by waiting in line.
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may be sufficiently high to cause creditors barred from access
to wages by prior garnishments to think favorably of involuntary bankruptcy either for its own sake or as leverage for encouraging a wage earners' proceeding.
Even under the present law there may be a rapid increase
in the number of wage earner proceedings in a jurisdiction. In
the western district of New York the number of wage earners'
proceedings rose in recent years from virtually none to 1,196 in
1975.14 If the leverage available in the Commission bill for encouraging such proceedings were to increase the frequency of
7
their use to the 1974 level in Alabama, namely 5,000 a year, "
one could expect roughly fifty times that number to be commenced each year throughout the country. Since a wage earners' proceeding would often last for three years, it would not be
unreasonable to expect 750,000 (three times 250,000) cases to
be pending during a given year.
Under the House version there would be fewer wage earners' proceedings because involuntary bankruptcy would not be
available against poorer consumer-debtors, who normally
would not owe $5,000 in debts above the amount of any security. The requirement that three creditors file an involuntary
petition when there are twelve or more creditors would prevent
a single harsh creditor from using involuntary bankruptcy to
encourage wage earners' proceedings in communities where
creditors are generally not inclined to do so. However, in parts
of the country where wage earners' proceedings are now popular
or in areas where their popularity would increase, middle income debtors may be encouraged by their creditors to use these
proceedings under threat of involuntary bankruptcy. If the
credit community is generally agreeable to this course, banks,
credit card issuers and other institutional creditors could readily establish among themselves standards for the cooperative
use of involuntary bankruptcy as a lever for encouraging wage
earners' proceedings.
The variation in garnishment laws from state to state
would be of some but lesser significance in regard to middle
income debtors. In states where only ten percent of a debtor's
wages may be garnished, creditors nevertheless would recover
74. In 1965, there were 11 Chapter XmI proceedings in the Western District as
opposed to 1,196 in 1975. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of
Bankruptcy Statistics (1975).
75. This figure has increased to 6,399 cases in 1975. Id.
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larger sums under state law from middle income debtors than
from poor debtors. The incentive to use the leverage of involuntary bankruptcy if it were available against poor debtors with
regular income would be greater than against middle income
debtors. In states with high homestead exemptions there would
be an incentive to encourage debtors, even those without a
large equity in their homes, to use wage earners' proceedings.
Creditors would realize more by this means than by filing judgment liens against homes. The acceptance of state homestead
exemptions by the House version would not remove this incentive. Creditors might be willing to risk a no-asset involuntary
bankruptcy for the purpose of encouraging a wage earners' proceeding. If the local bankruptcy judge is cooperative and the
debtor poorly represented, the risk that the debtor would simply accept the involuntary and potentially no-asset straight
bankruptcy rather than convert to a wage earners' proceeding
would be reduced.
Substantial arguments, then, support a prediction that
under the Commission bill or the House version creditors would
have strong incentives to use involuntary bankruptcy as a lever
to encourage varying classes of consumer-debtors to file petitions in wage earners' proceedings. It could be asserted, however, that such proceedings would be in the best interests of
debtors in financial difficulty. Debtors who under any of several tests are unable to pay their debts as they mature may
badly need the guidance of a federal court and the counseling
and training which would enable them to conduct their affairs
more carefully. The policy of rehabilitating debtors, which is
one of the purposes of a bankruptcy law, would be served as
well as the policy of affording creditors an orderly means for
collecting debts.
However, the circumstances of these debtors would be
changed substantially from those prevailing under present law.
Involuntary bankruptcy now is not normally used against
consumer-debtors nor is there any leverage in the present act
to compel debtors to file petitions in wage earners' proceedings.
The proposed acts, then, would create varying classes of
consumer-debtors. Opportunities for harassing and threatening
these debtors which are not now available would be created.
Under the present law, consumer-debtors have the opportunity
to seek bankruptcy or a wage earners' proceeding voluntarily.
The proposed acts would provide the means for persuading
those who have not chosen these routes to file petitions for wage
earners' proceedings. Debtors who would have chosen to suffer
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state remedies or to work out their debts privately would be
subjected to guidance and control. Some debtors who would be
judgment proof or for other reasons substantially immune from
state remedies would pay their creditors significant sums.
Some debtors who would have recovered financial stability
without the assistance of the bankruptcy courts would receive
that assistance which may prolong the period of their recovery.
While some debtors would benefit from the supervision and
guidance thrust upon them, one must wonder whether these
benefits outweigh the disadvantages of paternalistic control by
a governmental institution. From the point of view of consumers as a class, one must ask whether the disadvantage of paternalistic control of a number of consumer-debtors, perhaps in
the order of 750,000 in a given year, is outweighed by the advantage of this control for some of that number.
One could conclude, then, that the provisions of the Commission bill and of the House version which make it easier for
creditors to have varying classes of consumer-debtors adjudicated bankrupts without their consent and easier to encourage
these debtors to file petitions for wage earners' proceedings
have a greater adverse impact upon consumer interests than
the present law. Nevertheless one should inquire whether these
provisions serve more general public interests. That inquiry is
the subject of a subsequent segment of this article.
Encouragement of Debtors to File Wage Earners' Proceedings
Instead of Voluntary Bankruptcy
Up to this point in the article the initiation of involuntary
proceedings has been discussed. However, the Bankruptcy
Commission has expressed its concern with the rising number
of voluntary personal bankruptcies. From 1965 to 1975 the
number of voluntary straight bankruptcies rose from 149,820 to
Many of the personal bankruptcies were no-asset
208,064.
76
cases.

As a partial remedy for the problem, the Commission has
made it more attractive for debtors to use wage earners' proceedings under Chapter VI of its bill than under Chapter XIII
of the present law." In addition, a debtor who files a voluntary
76. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 8.
77. The Bankruptcy Co~imission noted that wage earners' plans have been popular in more than a dozen districts but little used in other areas. Id. The Bankruptcy
Commission suggested that Chapter XIII was not workable everywhere because
"referees and lawyers and members of the credit community differ as to its virtues and
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petition would be counseled as to the relief available under
Chapter VI.11 This would appear sensible and unthreatening
provided the debtor would also have access to adequate counseling and representation from an attorney independent of the
bankruptcy administration established by the Commission
bill."9 There is some reason to believe that debtors in parts of
the country where wage earners' proceedings are now frequently used are subject to social pressure to choose these proceedings rather than straight bankruptcy. The counseling of
debtors under the Commission bill may provide an opportunity
for further social pressure in favor of wage earners' proceedings."0
No similar provision appears in the House version. However, the court is given the power at anytime to dismiss a case
or suspend all proceedings in it if "the interests of creditors and
disadvantages." Id. The Bankruptcy Commission further stated that the mortality
rate among extensions which require 100 percent repayments was high because they
often overburden debtors and their families. Similarly, compositions were not widely
used because the confirmed composition was a bar to further relief under the present
act for 6 years, and creditor consent is often lacking. Creditors also vetoed Chapter XIII
plans where prompt and full payment was unprovided for despite depreciation of their
secured collateral. Id. See also note 70 supra; note 88 infra.
78. Counseling was seen by the Commission as improving the attractiveness and
utility of plans for repayment by consumer-debtors out of future earnings. Consumerdebtors, who the Commission believed, were often uninformed about their options,
would become aware of their alternatives through counseling. Senate Hearings, supra
note 4, at 8.
Professor Frank Kennedy, Executive Director of the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, testified before the Senate hearings that:
[olne of the reasons the Commission was convinced Chapter XIII has
such a nonuniform use throughout the country is that debtors are not
sufficiently informed about the options available to them. In districts
where Chapter XIII is extensively used, there may be reason for doubt
that debtors even know they have the option of straight bankruptcy.
Id. at 23.
79. Mr. Frank Kennedy also testified that:
the Commission contemplated that the nature of that counseling would
be informational counseling that would tell the debtor what the options
are under the act, what the features of straight bankruptcy are, what the
features of a plan are, and the Commission proposed to make this kind
of relief and this kind of counseling available only to persons with regular
income on the assumption that only a debtor with a fairly regular and
stable income can propose and realistically live up to a plan contemplating payment out of future earnings.
Id.
80. Professor Philip Schuchman believed that the very purpose of counseling was
to encourage wage earners' proceedings. "From what I know of counselors and have
seen and heard, I fear that they may very well encourage Chapter XIII or its equivalent
in any new act. I can see no other reason why it is provided in the Commission bill
....
"House Hearings, supra note 5, at 865.
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the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension. ' 8 ' Indeed, under section 305(c) a decision to dismiss or not
"is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."8 Unlike the parallel
provision in the Commission bill, the power is available in
voluntary as well as involuntary cases. In the House version the
in
provisions governing wage earners' proceedings are found
to wage earners'
committed
judge
a
Conceivably,
13.
Chapter
proceedings could in cases he deemed appropriate threaten to
dismiss the voluntary straight bankruptcy unless it were converted to a Chapter 13 case. It is true that under section 706(c)
the court may not itself convert a straight bankruptcy, or as the
House version calls it, a liquidation case, to a wage earners'
proceeding. One must also recognize that under section 1307(a)
the debtor may convert a Chapter 13 proceeding to a liquidation case at any time. Nevertheless the bankruptcy judge arguably could dismiss a straight bankruptcy unless the debtor
agreed to convert to Chapter 13. If the debtor then reconverted
to straight bankruptcy, the judge could dismiss the case. Despite the prohibition on review in section 305(c), an appellate
court should find such a maneuver contrary to the intent of the
statute since it would be an effective denial of the right to
convert a wage earners' proceeding to a straight bankruptcy.
The proposed statute does not grant the bankruptcy judge unreviewable discretion to prevent such conversion. The Senate
version would support this conclusion since it provides that
"any waiver of the right to convert a case under this subsection
is unenforceable."" Nevertheless, both bills could provide a
clearer basis for such a conclusion. Indeed, in the absence of
such a clearer basis, some courts may conclude that the intent
of the House version is to reduce the number of voluntary bankruptcies by the means just outlined. A conclusion such as this
would prevent debtors from exercising their now historic option
of seeking immediate rehabilitation by surrendering their property for distribution to creditors in return for a discharge from
their debts.
Congress has shown no desire to make such a radical
change. Undoubtedly, however, some debtors would benefit
from paying their debts from future income over a period of
81. House Bill, supra note 6, § 305(a)(1). See also id. § 707. Query what the
interrelation is of section 707's provision that dismissal shall be only for cause with
section 305(a)?
82. Id. § 305(c).
83. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 1307(a).
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three years. Others need the financial training provided by a
Chapter 13 proceeding. Nevertheless, the productivity of others
or their likelihood of financial rehabilitation would be lessened
by paternalistic control of their affairs during a three year period. The traditional option of voluntary bankruptcy, then,
should remain fully available. A voluntary choice of Chapter
13 proceedings would provide assistance to those who would
desire it or benefit from it." To compel others to choose it in
place of voluntary bankruptcy would subtract seriously from
the historical protection afforded consumer-debtors.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the prpvision in section 305(c) is ill considered even if used for other purposes than
reducing straight bankruptcies by consumer-debtors. It gives
84. A substantial number of suggestions were made in an effort to
aid this choice:
1. Require the Court to assume exclusive jurisdiction over all debts
of
the debtor, including priority, secured, and unsecured debts. Allow
the
Court to adjust the payments to the priority and secured creditors,
as
may be required, to achieve a reasonable and workable repayment
plan
that is not a material effect upon the priority and secured creditors.
2. Require any applicant for relief under the Act to acknowledge
that
his filing will result in either an outright bankruptcy or a repayment
plan
under Chapter XIII, as may be determined by the Court.
3. Require any consumer petitioner to show to the satisfaction
of the
Court that his debt problem is an unbearable, insurmountable problem
that cannot be reasonably resolved by a repayment plan from
future
income.
4. Require the Court to rule whether a Chapter XIII repayment plan
is
a reasonable solution to the debt problem presented.
5. Allow the Court to rule on the form of relief available to the
petitioner, regular bankruptcy or a repayment plan.
6. Allow any party of interest to file an application for reconsideration
of the decision of the Court. This application will be based on new
information which was not available to the Court at the time of the original
decision.
7. Allow the District Court to review any decision made by the
Bankruptcy Judge upon a reconsideration.
8. Require the debtor to pay not more than nor less than 10%
of the
money paid in under the Plan as his fee for the services of the trustee
and
the Court. A fee of 10% to the debtor is not excessive considering
the
average creditor charge is in excess of 10% and creditor charges
are
usually eliminated or drastically reduced. Debtors who can and desire
to
pay their debts do not object to this reasonable fee of 10%.
9. Require the trustee to take no more than 5% of the fees collected
for
his personal services, but not more than the salary presently being
paid
to the Bankruptcy Judge.
10. Require the trustee to limit his office expenses to no more than
is
actual and necessary as determined by the Bankruptcy Judge.
11. Require the trustee to remit, semi-annually, all fees collected
in
excess of the above limitations to an agency herein proposed, the
Consumer Debt Relief Program.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1399 (statement of Duncan H.
Kester).
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the bankruptcy judge an uncontrolled power to determine
when bankruptcy is appropriate or inappropriate. Thus, the
availability of bankruptcy in any district will depend on the
policies or prejudices of the bankruptcy judge. In view of this
provision, it would be difficult to pretend that the House version offers a uniform law on the subject of bankruptcies.
The Impact on the Public Interest
The Commission bill and the House version, in somewhat
different ways, would make it easier to obtain involuntary
bankruptcy and would probably increase substantially the
number of these proceedings. Under both proposed laws involuntary bankruptcy may be used as a lever against different but
overlapping groups of consumer-debtors to encourage the filing
of wage earners' proceedings. Under the House version and to
some degree under the Commission bill voluntary bankruptcy
may be discouraged or limited as a debtor's remedy. While
these positions invade substantial interests of consumerdebtors, one must inquire nevertheless what their impact
would be on the public interest.
To do so, one must propose some criteria for measuring the
public interest. Bankruptcy law presents two considerations,
namely the twin purposes of any modern bankruptcy law: first,
providing an orderly process for the collection of the debtor's
property and distribution of it to creditors; and second, rehabilitating the debtor.85 Since in regard to some proposed rules,
analysis against these purposes would produce conflicting assessments, it would be desirable to find and use as additional
criteria some common interests or collective goals of society
which are not directly related to debtor or creditor interests but
which would support or provide reasons for accepting the two
purposes of bankruptcy law.8" One collective goal which would
support the purpose of collecting property for creditors is the
preservation of credit. The purpose of rehabilitating debtors
85. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375
(1965). The technique for evaluating legislative proposals suggested here is not dissimilar to the technique of statutory interpretation employed in the above cases, i.e.,
weighing the proposed changes against the dual purposes of the bankruptcy act.

86.

See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975), reprinted in R.

DWORKIN, TAKINo RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). In particular, note Dworkin's discussion of

statutory interpretation and its similarity to the analysis proposed here. See id. at
1085-87. See also Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344 (1830),
aff'd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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may be supported by the societal goals of preserving productive
economic units and encouraging debtors to support themselves
in place of resort to the welfare roles. In addition, it is submitted that the traditional American concern for human dignity
would support the purpose of rehabilitating debtors.
One could determine the impact of the proposals under
discussion on the public interest by measuring each of them in
turn against the criteria just outlined. In regard to each, then,
one should ask whether its adoption would enhance significantly the availability of credit, whether it would tend to preserve or lessen the productivity of economic units, and what
effect it would have on human dignity.
An increase in the number of involuntary bankruptcies
could enable some creditors to obtain a larger repayment of the
amount owed to them. However, given the large number of noasset bankruptcies, this additional recovery should be comparatively small. It should not be significant when compared tp
outstanding consumer debt. It is unlikely that recovery of additional funds by involuntary bankruptcy would significantly
enhance the availability of credit or decrease its cost. Nevertheless, some consumer-debtors who would have escaped involuntary bankruptcy would be thrust into it and it would become
possible to harass consumers with threats of involuntary bankruptcy. For these reasons, there is some likelihood that the
productivity of financially distressed consumer-debtors would
be reduced and the protection afforded their human dignity
lessened.
Creditors would probably recover more substantial sums
through the increased number of wage earners' proceedings
likely under the proposed bankruptcy laws. Nevertheless, when
compared to the outstanding amount of consumer credit, these
additional repayments probably would be too small to affect
significantly the cost or the availability of credit. The productivity of some debtors would be enhanced by the experience of
a wage earners' proceeding while it is likely that the productivity of others would be lessened. The human dignity of some
would be enhanced by finding a way to pay their creditors while
others would suffer a loss of human dignity by being subjected
to the supervision of the federal court for a three year period.
Completely voluntary proceedings coupled with an educational
program 7 could produce the beneficial results just described
87. One such educational program was initiated by the National Association of
Chapter Xm Trustees:
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while avoiding those which are detrimental. One must also
assess the impact of having as many as 750,000 debtors in wage
earners' proceedings during a given year. Governmental paternalism on this scale resembles the social welfare system which
has a pervasive and notoriously bad effect on the productivity
and human dignity of the recipients of welfare.
To compel debtors to use wage earners' proceedings in
place of voluntary bankruptcy would not make credit significantly more available or less costly. The number of involuntary
bankruptcies today, although large, is insignificant when compared with the outstanding amount of consumer credit."8 Although there are now a large number of straight, voluntary,
personal, no-asset bankruptcies, credit is readily available and
not costly when compared with other eras or with the circumstances in other countries. Consumer credit is extraordinarily
easy to obtain. Decreasing the availability of voluntary bankruptcy, then, probably would not affect significantly the ability
to obtain credit or its cost. It would, however, prevent some
debtors from using voluntary bankruptcy as a means of rapid
financial rehabilitation. This would affect their productivity
and their human dignity.
Arguably, then, the provisions of the Commission bill and
the House version which are under discussion would not only
invade substantial consumer interests but would have a deleterious effect on the public interest. Several simple changes,
some of which have been discussed, would soften these adverse results of the proposed laws. Either consumer-debtors
generally, or those who earn less than a fixed amount such as
$20,000, or those who owe less than $10,000 over the amount
of any security should be free from involuntary bankruptcy. 9
The bankruptcy judge under the House version should be
clearly denied the power to dismiss a voluntary petition beOur association for a number of years has printed and distributed, by the
thousands, a pamphlet. . . to Social Service and Welfare Departments,
personnel offices, labor organizations, businesses, creditors and any
worthwhile organization or group who are exposed to financially distressed individuals. These pamphlets are distributed for educational purposes, and in those areas where it is used the results always reflect an
increase in filings.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1398 (statement of Duncan H. Kester).
88. Compare 208,064 voluntary straight bankruptcies in 1975 with 196.7 billion
dollars of outstanding consumer credit. See generally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTAcT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1976).

89. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 851-52 (testimony of Samuel J.M.
Donnelly). See also note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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cause of a refusal to convert to Chapter 13. If the House version
is enacted without these changes and experience proves that
the predicated results have occurred, then a basis would be
present for Congress to make further changes.
THE COLLECTION OF THE ESTATE

In the evolution of a bankruptcy proceeding the institution
of a voluntary or involuntary action is followed by collection
and distribution of the debtor's estate to creditors and by the
granting or denial of discharge. When discussing both collection of the estate and discharge, one should be aware that the
debtor and his creditors are engaged in what could be described
as a great game. The goal of the game for the debtor is to retain
as much property as possible despite the bankruptcy proceeding. The exemption provisions of state and federal law are the
most plainly relevant tools for achieving this goal. One should,
however, recognize that a variety of other tools are useful, including the practice of reaffirming debts owed secured creditors
in exchange for not reclaiming property and, in regard to exempt property, the assertion of the debtor's defenses or the
avoiding of creditors' liens by the trustee." The choice of wage
earners' proceedings, of course, would allow the debtor to retain
a substantial amount of property. The creditors' goal in this
great game is to have the debts owed to them survive the bankruptcy proceeding. A second goal is to be paid as much as
possible. Because the creditors are often the aggressors in this
game, they would attempt on occasion to take advantage of the
debtor's desire to retain property to achieve their goals. Reaffirmation of debts is a tool readily used for the purposes of creditors as well as debtors. Principal tools for achieving the goal of
having debts survive bankruptcy are the provisions concerning
denial of and exceptions to discharge. Some of these tools have
functions to perform in wage earners' proceedings as well as
straight bankruptcy.
While the provisions concerning discharge are part of the
great game, discussion of them is appropriately located in the
90. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 852 (testimony of Samuel J.M. Donnelly).
91. Another prevalent practice is the cosigning of loans made to the debtor. This
allows the creditor recourse against the co-signor for any balance if the debtor defaults.

However, the House version in certain circumstances would forbid the collection of the
debt from the co-signor. This, of course, would restrict the availability of credit to those
debtors. See House Bill, supra note 6, § 524(a)(3), (d).
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next part of this article. In this part the portions of the great

game related to collection of the estate are examined. Both the
Commission bill and the House version have provisions affecting this game which should be assessed to determine their impact on the interests of the consumer and the public interest.
Reaffirmations and Redemptions
Section 4-504 of the Commission bill allows the debtor to
redeem exempt or abandoned property "from a lien securing a
dischargeable consumer debt" by paying the fair market value
of the property. An agreement to redeem may be enforced
against the bankrupt debtor under section 4-504(b) but under
section 4-507, with one additional exception, no other debt extinguished by a discharge may be revived or reaffirmed. 3
These provisions of the Commission bill bring into the
open and regulate a device frequently used in the great game
described earlier. The trustee would often abandon property
subject to a security interest. However, the debt supporting the
security interest would be discharged. Rather than repossess or
reclaim the collateral which may be worth less than the
amount of the debt, a secured creditor may offer to allow the
debtor to retain the property in exchange for reaffirming the
debt and thereby reviving the personal obligation. 4 The past
consideration would support the new post bankruptcy promise.
The revival of the debt coupled with retention of the property
by the bankrupt may serve the goals of both debtor and creditor. However, the debtor who is not well advised and is under
pressure from his adverse circumstances may reaffirm debts
foolishly. Possibly the amount of debts revived in this manner
may be great enough to leave the debtor after bankruptcy in
as difficult a financial condition as he was before. For several
years he would be unable to obtain another discharge. In classic
terms, then, his last state would be worse than his first. Testi92. The provision does not apply to a debt secured by nonexempt property that
is greater in value than the secured debt, because the trustee would not abandon the
property but would sell it for the benefit of the estate. See Commission Bill, supranote
6, § 4-504.
93. See id. § 4-507(b). See also House Bill, supra note 6, §§ 524(b), 722; note 152
and accompanying text infra.
94. An investigation by the Federal Trade Commission found: "An endless variety of techniques was employed to secure these [reaffirmation] agreements, usually
prior to the consumer's receipt of a discharge. The more common inducements were
threats to property, threats to reputation and standing, and offers of additional cash."
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fying on behalf of the National Consumer Law Center, Professor Richard Hesse stated:
In our informal survey of legal services lawyers, reaffirmation problems were found in 28% of the cases. The most
frequent complaint was pressure by and fear of the creditor; 21 of 31 respondents cited that cause. Six respondents
cited the debtor's desire to retain the collateral (mainly
household furnishings and automobiles) as the principal
reason for reaffirmation. When asked what changes in the
present law are needed to protect the debtor from unwanted reaffirmation, the responses include suggestions
which evidenced great concern and fear that unsupervised
reaffirmation of consumer debts would produce unconscionable results. Debtors should be able to make truly voluntary payments on discharged debts. Debtors should be
given the option to redeem collateral and settle dischargeability disputes as long as the redemption or settlement is
supervised and fair. But there is no sound reason to allow
reaffirmation of discharged debts to be consideration for
future advances or to permit creditors to obtain binding
agreements to pay discharged debts."
The restrictions in the Commission bill on revivals or reaffirmations would control this problem. The provision of section
4-504 permitting the debtor to redeem for the fair market value
of the collateral would keep the debtor from reaffirming debts
in an amount greater than the value of the property retained
and may discourage creditors from pressing for reaffirmations.
This aspect of the bill could be improved by including a provision in section 4-504 similar to the requirement in section 4506(b) that the agreement be "entered in good faith" and be
"approved by the court."96
95. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 315 (statement of Richard A. Hesse).
96. The American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association
favored reaffirmation if approved by the bankruptcy court within a reasonable time
after the filing of the petition. Id. at 128 (statement of Walter W. Vaughn). The
National Consumer Law Center took the position that "debtors should be given the
option to redeem collateral and settle dischargeability disputes as long as the redemption or settlement is supervised and fair. But there is no sound reason to allow reaffirmation of discharged debts to be consideration for future advances or to permit creditors to obtain binding agreements to pay discharged debts." Id. at 315 (statement of
Richard A. Hesse).
Other witnesses before the Senate Hearings favored reaffirmations subsequent to
a "cooling off" after the filing of the petition. Linn K. Twinem who testified on behalf
of Beneficial Finance (which controls about 9.6% of the finance company market in
the United States) favored a cooling off period, but was opposed to court approval for
reaffirmations. Id. at 198-99. Mr. Benjamin L. Zelenko who accompanied Mr. Twinem
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The provisions of the House version resemble substantially
those of the Commission bill but are numbered differently. A
key provision is section 722 which reads as follows:
. An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor
has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem
tangible personal property intended primarily for personal,
family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under
section 522 of this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title by the trustee, by paying the holder
of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of
such holder that is secured by such lien.97
An agreement to redeem is enforceable despite a discharge. However, with one additional exception, no other revival or reaffirmation would be enforceable. Under section
524(b):
After the commencement of a case under this title, a
creditor may not enter into an agreement with the debtor
the consideration for which in whole or in part is based on
a debt of the debtor that is dischargeable in a case under
this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
Any such agreement is void. 8
This wording has stronger rhetoric in it than an earlier
House bill." It may be responsible for the rumor that the House
version has eliminated reaffirmations.'0 Actually it has not.
Both the House version and the Commission bill leave intact
the bulk of reasonable revivals of debt, those in settlement of
objections to discharge which will be discussed below and those
which are part of an agreement to redeem. Any other reaffirmation by a debtor would seriously interfere with the policy of
rehabilitation.10 1The House version has improved the Commissuggested that outright denial of reaffirmations is "an unwarranted and overly harsh
interference with the freedom of contract between debtor and creditor" whose retroactive application could feasibly raise constitutional due process questions. Id. at 207-

08.
97. House Bill, supra note 6, § 722.
98. Id. § 524(b).
99. H.R. 6, supra note 6, § 524(b) provided: "A debt is not enforceable to the
extent that the consideration for such debt is based in whole or in part on a debt

discharged in a case under this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived."
100. See, e.g., Minard, A Pound of Flesh?, FoRBEs, June 15, 1977, at 94.
101. However, for a debtor who wishes to keep his house after bankruptcy, this
provision may work a hardship. If the homestead exemption is unable to cover the
debtor's equity, the only escape left to the debtor and his mortgagee, who similarly

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

sion's approach by requiring in section 524(c) that both agreements settling objections to discharge and agreements for redemption be "entered into in good faith" and be approved by
the court. 02 Both the provisions in the Commission bill and the
House version provoked considerable opposition from creditor
interests. 013 If these provisions were weakened, consumers
would continue to be exposed to a problem which has caused
concern in the administration of the present law.
Section 524(b) of the Senate version offers a substantially
different scheme for controlling revivals and reaffirmation of
debts. Any debt discharged in bankruptcy may be revived or
reaffirmed. Rather than prohibiting the revival of some debts,
the Senate bill puts a check on all revivals or reaffirmations by
permitting the debtor to "rescind his revival or reaffirmation
by written notice to all concerned creditors within 30 days."' 01 4
Presumably, this would afford debtors greater protection
than the House version in those instances when bankrupts revive debts in settlement of discharge or in order to redeem
exempt or abandoned property. However, it does permit revivals in circumstances not allowable under the House bill. One
such circumstance would be where new credit is extended on
the condition that an old debt be reaffirmed. In this situation,
it is questionable whether the opportunity to change his mind
in thirty days will adequately protect the debtor. In fact, the
troubled debtor will probably be poorly counseled and may not
even know of his right to rescind.
Inappropriate revival of debts discharged in bankruptcy
would tend to defeat both goals of a bankruptcy law: orderly
collection and distribution of the debtor's property and rehabilitation of debtors. Revival would enable some particular creditors to collect a greater portion of the amount owed them and
would take place ultimately after and outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. It would seem contrary to a second goal of
a bankruptcy law to afford creditors an orderly process for colwishes to see the house survive the bankruptcy proceedings, is the provison for abandonment of the property. Another possibility would be to discharge the debt with a
new mortgage and loan issued after bankruptcy.
102. House Bill, supra note 6, § 524(c). There is no "good faith" provision in the
Senate version. See Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 524(b).
103. See Senate Hearings,supra note 4, at 190-91, 197-99 (testimony of Linn K.
Twinem); id. at 203, 207-11 (testimony of Benjamin L. Zalenko); id. at 142-43, 181-83
(testimony of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr.); id. at 315 (testimony of Richard A. Hesse). See also
note 97 supra; Minard, supra note 10.
104. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 524(b).
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lecting and distributing the debtor's property. For these reasons weakening of the proposed regulation of reaffirmation
°
would be contrary to the public interest.' 0
Unconscionability and the Assertion by the Trustee of Debtor
Defenses
The present law in section 70(c) states explicitly that the
0
trustee shall have "all defenses available to the bankrupt"'
against third persons. This right could also be implied in section 70(a) which vests the trustee as of the date of bankruptcy
with title to the bankrupt's property." 7 The trustee's status as
successor in title to the bankrupt would vest him with the
defenses available to his predecessor.
In section 4-403(b) of the Commission bill one may find a
list of claims which may not be allowed. Where "the debtor can
defend against the enforcement of the claim"'" under any relevant law it may not be allowed. A provision interesting to consumers is found in section 4-403(b)(8) which prohibits the enforcement of an "unconscionable consumer claim."'"0 In section
4-403(c) unconscionability is defined more particularly"' and
105. But see statement of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., predicting that: "most creditors
would opt for immediate return of collateral or accelerate the payment of the value
fixed in the bankruptcy proceeding. Down payments on depreciating collateral would
be higher and the term of the obligation shorter." Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at
143.
Note also that the right of reaffimation is not necessary in order for the bankrupt
to pay his debts if he chooses to.
[11f your client wishes to pay creditors whose claims have been discharged in bankruptcy, he is free to do so and you should commend him
for it. But he should not make any promises. He should put nothing in
writing. He should simply pay. There is nothing in law that prevents him
from paying a discharged debt.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 873 (statement of Philip Shuchman).
106. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970).
107. Id. § 70(a).
108. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 2-403(b)(1).
109. Id. § 4-403(b)(8).
110. Section 4-403(c) defines unconscionability as:
(c) Unconscionability. Without limiting the scope of clause (8) of the
subdivision (b), the following, among other things, may be considered as
pertinent to the issue of unconscionability:
(1) the degree to which unfair advantage was taken against the
debtor in any aspect of the transaction from which the claim arises
or in any aspect of any enforcement of the claim, because of his
lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or physical or mental capacity;
(2) substantial disparity between the price of goods or services
and their value as measured by the price of the same or compara-
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perhaps more favorably to the consumer than in section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code."'
If the trustee were to use such a provision aggressively it
could serve as one tool for policing the market place to prevent
unconscionable contracts. However, the provision is also relevant to the great game in which the bankrupt debtor's goal is
to retain as much property as possible despite bankruptcy. The
trustee could assert the debtor's defenses, including unconscionability, in regard to debts secured by exempt or abandoned property. Such property could then be set aside for the
bankrupt debtor.
The House version does not appear to contain a provision concerning unconscionable consumer claims."' While it
is arguable that this is a factor making it less desirable for
the consumer than the Commission bill, one should note
that under section 502(b)(1) a claim which is "unenforceable
ble goods or services generally prevailing at the time in his community; and
(3) definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations, rulings, and decisions of State and federal legislative, administrative,
and judicial bodies.
Id. at 4-403(c).
111. U.C.C. § 2-302 states:
Unconscionable Contract or Clause
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
But see Senate Hearings,supra note 4, at 127 (statement of Walter W. Vaughn, where
he stated that U.C.C. § 2-302 and cases decided thereunder would not be broadened
by § 4-403(b)(8), (c) and therefore the latter two sections were unnecessary).
112. This omission may be a response to the plea made by the National Consumer Finance Association at the House Hearings:
We believe that the question of unconscionability does not belong in the
Bankruptcy Act. In most states the question of unconscionability in the
formation or enforcement of a consumer contract is governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, most states have
enacted comprehensive consumer credit protection laws specifying standards for determination of unconscionability in different types of consumer credit transactions. Any determination of unfair advantage over
the debtor should be left to the judicial process outside the Bankruptcy
Court and between the debtor and his creditor.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1364.
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against the debtor under any applicable law" may not be allowed." 3 The trustee, then, may assert the debtor's defenses
under section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. What is
lost is the more elaborate definition of unconscionability found
in the Commission bill. While this loss is lamentable, the impact of the change on the interests of either the consumer or
the public should be minimal.
Wage Earners' Proceedings and the Great Game
The Commission placed the rules governing wage earners'
proceedings in Chapter VI of its bill, while the House version
changed the numbering back to the traditional Chapter 13. As
noted earlier, the provisions of the Commission bill and House
bill governing the initiation of bankruptcy offer considerable
leverage to creditors. Creditors may use this leverage to achieve
their goal of receiving higher payments through a wage earners'
proceeding than they would in the absence of bankruptcy.
However, debtors may also use wage earners' proceedings to
further their goal of obtaining a discharge while retaining a
maximum amount of property.
An important provision of the Commission bill, section 6201(2), serves this goal of debtors. It has two significant aspects. The wage earners' plan may deal "with claims secured
by personal property severally, on any terms" and secondly
''may provide for the curing of defaults within a reasonable
time.""'
Under the present law each secured creditor whose claim
is dealt with by a wage earners' plan must consent to it. This
provision makes it difficult to rehabilitate a debtor through a
wage earners' proceeding when most of his property is subject
to security interests. However, under section 6-204(b) of the
Commission bill the court is directed to confirm a plan if it
"provides for the preservation to each secured creditor affected
by the plan of the value of his claim against the property of the
debtor, is in the best interests of the creditors and is feasible."" 5 The consent of creditors to the plan is not required.
Coupled with section 6-201(2), this provision allows the plan to
deal adequately with secured claims. The value of the claims
must be preserved but by virtue of section 4-402(b) the value
113.
114.
115.

House Bill, supra note 6, § 502(b)(1).
Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 6-201(2).
Id. § 6-204(b).
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of the claim may not exceed the value of the collateral. In
addition to reducing or cramming down the claim of the secured creditor to the value of the collateral, the plan may also
stretch out payments while still preserving the value of the
claim.
The plan may provide for the curing of defaults when payments to a secured creditor have been skipped. A similar rule
in regard to secured claims against the debtor's residence may
be found in section 6-201(4). 111 The debtor may also have the
advantage of the rules discussed earlier on redemptions and
reaffirmations." 7 Under section 4-504, which is a rule applicable to all proceedings in bankruptcy, the debtor may redeem
or make an enforceable agreement to redeem exempt or abandoned property subject to a security interest."' He may do so
by "paying the holder of the lien the fair market value of the
property or, if less, the amount of the claim.""' This provision
is remarkably similar to section 6-204(b)'s reference to the
value of the secured creditor's claim. Taken together all of
these provisions would provide the debtor with a full bag of
tools for bringing property through a wage earners' proceeding.
The provisions of the House version may be used in a
similar manner. Under section 1322(b)(2), (3), (4) and (5) of
that bill the debtor's plan may modify the rights of holders of
secured claims or provide for curing of a default. 0 The court
may confirm a plan under section 1325 provided:
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the
plan;
(B) the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing
such claim to such holder ....
116. Id. § 6-201(4).
117. See notes 90-105 and accompanying text supra.
118. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-504.
119. Id. § 4-504(a).
120. Compare Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 1322(b)(2), (3), (4), (5), which duplicates the House provisions except that the language relating to real property mortgages
is inserted in subsection (b)(2) which now states that a plan may "modify the rights

of holders of secured claims (other than claims wholly secured by mortgages on real
property) or of holders of unsecured claims."
121. House Bill, supra note 6, § 1325(a)(5).
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Upon examination these provisions resemble those in the
Commission bill but are more flexible. To understand the provisions fully, one must relate section 1325(a)(5)(B) to section
506 concerning the determination of secured status. A creditor's claim under section 506(a) is "a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest

. . .

in such prop-

erty, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that such value
is less than the amount of such allowed claim."'' When this
definition is read together with section 1325 (a)(5)(B) one can
perceive an equivalent of the cram down provision in the Commission bill.
Both the Commission bill and the House version, then,
provide the consumer with ample means to perserve his property while obtaining a discharge in a wage earners' proceeding.
Standing alone the greater attractiveness of these proceedings
is both in the interest of the consumer and the public. However,
when joined with the very large potential increase in wage earners' proceedings described earlier, these provisions may fill in
some portions of the emerging portrait of a new and undesirable paternalism in bankruptcy law.
Exemptions
The exemption provisions found in the Commission bill
are designed to replace those of state law for the purpose of
bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast, the House version gives
the bankrupt a choice between its exemption provisions and
those of state law.12 3 As explained earlier the choice allowed by
the House version would reduce considerably the incentives for
filing involuntary petitions.
Exemption provisions, however, also play a role in the
great game. The debtor should use exemptions as a principal
tool for retaining property despite a bankruptcy proceeding.
While exemptions are tools for achieving this goal of the debtor,
from the viewpoint of the public interest, they serve a major
purpose of bankruptcy law, that of rehabilitating debtors. It
would be worthwhile to recall some national goals which support the policy of rehabilitating debtors. Among these are the
goals of promoting and preserving productive economic units,
encouraging individuals and families to be self-supporting
rather than seeking welfare assistance, and preserving human
122.
123.

Id. § 506(a).
House Bill, supra note 6, § 522(b).
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dignity. Any particular strategy for rehabilitation may be evaluated by determining whether it furthers goals such as these." 4
A principal exemption in the Commission bill is for the
homestead of the debtor. The aggregate value allowable as a
homestead exemption is "$5,000 plus $500 for each dependent
of the debtor."' 25 While this amount would protect only a very
small house, it must be considered in relation to the amount
of down payment which a purchaser would make in order to
obtain a standard mortgage. If banks normally will advance
seventy-five percent of the purchase price, then a $5,000 homestead exemption would support a $20,000 home. The $5,000
homestead exemption would seem a parsimonious protection of
human dignity but at least a small step towards insulating a
bankrupt debtor from the need for public assistance.
When the bankrupt does not exhaust the amount applicable to a homestead exemption he may select as exempt additional property of the type listed in section 4-503(c)(1) and (2)
up to the amount of the unused homestead exemption. In any
event under these clauses the following property would be exempt: "(1) livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles to
the aggregate value of not more than $1,000; (2) a burial plot
to the value of $2,500."126
These exemptions could be described as a compilation and
restatement of traditional state exemption laws. It could be
argued that such laws, by exempting specific categories of
124.

L.E. Creel III, in his testimony at the House Hearings stated:
Since the determination of exemptions is based upon two not necessarily inconsistent, but certainly different philosophical puposes, to wit:
(i) the minimum amount of properties which should be allowed to any
individual in order for him to retain his dignity and to attempt selfrehabilitation and (ii) the maximum amount of properties which an individual should be permitted to retain before infringing upon the reasonable interests of creditors in property of the debtor, and since the former
purpose (allowance of exemptions) is properly national in scope, while the
latter (permission of exempt) is essentially local, any new bankruptcy act
should properly address itself only to minimum exemptions, while leaving the definition of maximum exemptions to the states.
The Committee, therefore, recommends that the new Bankruptcy
Act provide only federal minimum exemptions consistent with the often
stated federal policy goal of "fresh start" and "rehabilitation". The relative rights of parties other than the bankrupt, being outside the "fresh
start" concept, are better determined by state law.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1658.
125. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(b)(1).
126. Id. § 4-503(c)(1), (2).
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property, support the dignity of the debtor or his ability to earn
a living. In contrast, a law allowing the debtor a lump sum
exemption of $3,000, for example, in lieu of all other exemptions, might undermine the dignity of the debtor." 7 A vivid
example of the difficulties which such a solution would present
can be seen in the possibility that a debtor, choosing the lump
sum in cash, would be deprived completely of wearing apparel.
A strong test would then be presented to a conscientious trustee
who would be compelled to determine whether sufficient wearing apparel should be abandoned to protect the debtor's modesty. Arguably, the Commission fell into this trap in section 4503(c)(1) under which a debtor so inclined could allocate his
entire $1,000 to preservation of his motor vehicle. The Commission has avoided falling into this classic trap a second time by
placing in subsection (c)(3) the exemption for cash and similar
sources of funds to the aggregate value of not more than $500. 12
Therefore, the debtor is not forced to choose between cash and
clothes. With the exception of the problem noted in connection
with section 4-503(c)(1), the Commission has adopted the better strategy of allocating minimum amounts to specific items
of property deemed vital and important. Moreover, the problem posed by section 4-503(c)(1) is at least somewhat mitigated
by the fact that an additional lump sum, the surplus from the
homestead exemption, may then be applied to specified property above and beyond the minimum amounts.
Use of the surplus from the homestead exemption in this
manner also avoids discrimination against those who rent or
who, for other reasons, are unable to claim the full homestead
exemption. However, a policy choice which may be discriminatory is hidden in these provisions. A debtor who rents may
apply the amount of the homestead exemption to the tools of
his trade or profession. It is not clear whether a debtor who
owns his home may waive his homestead exemption and apply
this amount to protecting his tools and hence his ability to earn
a living. The policy grounds supporting this potential discrimination are also not clear. There is, of course, plain discrimina127. See generally Karlen, Exemptions From Execution, 22 Bus. LAw. 1167
(1967).
128. It was suggested that a figure of $500 would eliminate most nominal assets
cases. Philip Schuchman stated: "[A]t the $500 level my guess is that of the present
nominal asset cases, 90 percent or more would be eliminated. This would not affect
creditors in any way. The only persons affected would be the trustees." House Hearings, supra note 5, at 864.
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tion in favor of that more comprehensive group who own either
houses or livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry or other items
mentioned in section 4-503(c)(1) in amounts up to $6,000 plus
$500 for each dependent, and against those who have other or
fewer assets. Those with other assests could of course sell them
and purchase section 4-503(c)(1) assets. Congress could avoid
this discrimination to some degree by allowing the surplus from
the homestead exemption to be applied to the property such as
cash and securities listed in subsection (c)(3).
There are a variety of other exemptions in the Commission
bill. The principal theme which runs through these additional
provisions is protection of income or related property required
for the future support of the debtor or his family. Exemptions
for alimony,' 9 pension rights,' disability benefits,'3' and the
like are akin to the basic exemption in straight bankruptcy of
future income. These resources are directly related to the goal
of promoting self maintenance by the debtor rather than reliance on public assistance.
Under the House version there is in most instances a larger
homestead exemption than in the Commission bill. 32 The
debtor is allowed to protect his interest in real or personal
property up to an amount of $10,000. 3 The exemption for a
burial plot is included in the homestead exemption."' In other
provisions the House version avoids presenting the debtor with
some of the dilemma described above. For example, there are
separate exemptions for a motor vehicle,'3 5 for tools of the
debtor's trade,' for jewelry'37 and for any other property up to
$500 plus the unused excess of his homestead exemption. 38
Each has a reasonable amount allocated to it which is in some
129. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(c)(4).
130. Id. § 4-503(c)(6).
131. Id. § 4-503(c)(7).
132. The Commission bill sets the exemption at $5,000 plus $500 per dependent.
The House version provides a flat $10,000 or the exemption allowed under state law.
133. House Bill, supra note 6, § 522(d)(1).
134. Id.
135. Section 522(d)(2) provides: "the following property may be exempted ...
[t]he debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value, in one motor vehicle." Id. §
522(d)(2).
136. Section 522(d)(6) provides: "The following property may be exempted...
It]he debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,000 in value, in any implements,
professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of
the debtor." Id. § 522(d)(6).
137. Id. § 522(d)(4) ($750 exemption).
138. Id. § 522(d)(5).
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instances larger than the aggregate amount allowed in section
4-503(c)(1) of the Commission bill which contains parallel provisions. The debtor is not put to a' choice between his car and
the tools of his trade. One provision of the House version at first
sight may appear to repeat the Commission's mistake of compelling a choice between necessary wearing apparel and other
property, but on closer reading it avoids this problem. The
language of section 522(d)(3) exempts the following property:
(3), The debtor's interest, not to exceed $300 in value
in any particular item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.'39
This provision does not compel the debtor to choose between the items listed up to an aggregate amount; rather, it
exempts all such items with a ceiling of $300 on any individual
item.
Following but expanding the pattern in the Commission
bill, the House version allows the debtor to apply the unused
amount of homestead exemption to "any particular item.' 40
This property could include cash. Some discrimination found
in the Commission bill between those who own favored property and those who do not is thereby avoided.
The House version includes but clarifies the exemptions
found in the Commission bill for property related to the future
support of the debtor and his family such as alimony, 4 ' pensions, and disability payments."' It specifically exempts the
right to receive these and other payments which might be considered property on the date of bankruptcy. The Commission
bill in some instances exempts the payments themselves which
may cover accumulated and banked past payments.
For all the reasons stated, the exemption provisions of the
House version seem to serve the interests of the consumer and
the goals of bankruptcy better than those of the Commission
bill. The most open-ended provision of the House version seems
139. Id. § 522(d)(3).
140. Id. § 522(d)(3). Under the Commission bill the unused portion of the homeowner's exemption may only be used on certain specified items. Undei the House
version it may be used to exempt anything.
141. House Bill, supra note 6, § 522(d)(10)(D).
142. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E), (C).
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to be section 522(d)(3) which was quoted above. A determined
debtor conceivably could buy a large amount of household furnishings and other items listed there in preparation for bankruptcy. Allowing this would serve the debtor's interest but not
any identifiable public interest. It would seem to defeat the
policy of collecting property for the benefit of creditors. Some
total limitation should be placed on section 522(d)(3) property.
The Senate version of the bankruptcy law eliminates the minimum federal exemptions found in the House bill. On this point,
it is less favorable to consumer-debtors.' In states with less
satisfactory exemption provisions than those found in the
House version, consumer-debtors playing the great game would
retain less property under the Senate formula. Significantly, in
states where the exemptions are inadequate for rehabilitation,
reliance on them clearly impairs a primary goal of bankruptcy.
DIsCHARGE

A principal goal of the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding
should be to obtain a discharge. When there are major obstacles to discharge of large debts, an attorney should hesitate to
recommend bankruptcy to a debtor. This last part of a bankruptcy is then closely related to the initiation and choice of a
proceeding. The rules concerning discharge may affect the percentage of debtors who choose voluntary straight bankruptcy
or as an alternative wage earners' proceedings. Discharge is
also related to the great game discussed in the second part of
this article in which debtors seek to retain a maximum amount
of property while creditors strive to have the debts owed them
survive the bankruptcy.
Discharge and the Initiation of Bankruptcy Proceedings
Section 4-505(7) of the Commission bill would deny a
debtor a discharge if he had been granted a discharge or had a
Chapter VII plan confirmed within five years of his petition."'
The House version, like the present law, does not permit a
second discharge within six years. 4 ' An earlier version of the
143.

Compare Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 522 with House Bill, supra note 6, §

522.
144. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-505(7).
145. See Bankruptcy Act, § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1970); House Bill, supra
note 6, § 727(a)(8). The 6 year limitation was retained unchanged in the Senate
version. See Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 727(a)(8).

19781

NEW BANKRUPTCY ACT

House bill, H.R. 6, set a seven year period in section 727(a) (8).
A lawyer for a debtor in financial distress should recommend bankruptcy only at the most advantageous moment
since a discharge would not be again available for five, six, or
seven years. Under present law a debtor may have a plan confirmed in a Chapter XIII wage earners' proceeding within six
years of a previous discharge provided the plan is for an extension rather than a composition of debt. 4 ' The Commission in
section 4-505(a)(7) removes all obstacles to wage earners' proceedings by extension, composition or both within their five
year period. 4 ' In section 727(a)(8) of the House version there
is a provision similar to the one just described which refers,
however, to the six year period.'48 Under both proposed acts,
then, a debtor may have a fair opportunity for relief in a wage
earners' proceeding despite a recent bankruptcy.
The purpose of the House version in affording this new
relief between bankruptcies may be seen in a different perspective, however, when the provisions just noted are juxtaposed to
section 305(a) which was discussed earlier. Under that provision the court may dismiss either a voluntary or involuntary
petition as not in the better "interests of creditors and the
debtor." It was suggested earlier that this provision was designed to encourage use of wage earners' proceedings in preference to straight bankruptcy. The six year period established by
the House version in section 727(a)(8), when joined with the
permission to use wage earners' proceedings between bankruptcies, would serve the same policy. The provisions may portray
a paternalistic design to push debtors seeking relief in federal
bankruptcy court into proceedings in which they can be
guided, counseled, and controlled for a three year period.
The provisions of the Commission bill which shorten the
period between bankruptcies from six years to five and which
allow confirmation of wage earners' plans by extension, composition or both within that period are plainly in the interest of
consumer debtors. However, when the provisions for wage earn146. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). A composition is an
agreement with creditors for some consideration, such as immediate payment, whereby
they agree to discharge their claims upon receipt. The payment is actually a lesser
amount than is actually owing on the claim. An extension is a prolongation of a period
previously fixed for payment of a creditor's debts, however, it does not involve a

discharge.
147. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-505(a)(7).
148. House Bill, supra note 6, § 727(a)(8).
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ers' proceedings within the five year period are seen in a different context, such as that of the House version just discussed,
one may wonder whether they have acquired a sinister cast.
A yet more sinister possibility may emerge from the discharge provisions of either the House version or the Commission bill. During a five, six, or seven year period following a
discharge a debtor would not be entitled to a second discharge
in straight bankruptcy. For that period of time the debtor
would be in effect on financial probation. When further debts
are accumulated, creditors would be able to threaten the
debtor with an involuntary bankruptcy in which the debtor
would lose his property but would not receive a discharge. The
debtor's principal defense would be conversion of the involuntary bankruptcy to a wage earner's proceeding. The prospect
of such conversion, however, may be the creditor's principal
incentive for filing an involuntary petition. The proposed laws,
then, would create a new class of debtors on probation who
would be peculiarly vulnerable to involuntary bankruptcy, to
what amounts to involuntary wage earners' proceedings, and to
creditor threats and harassment. This class does not exist
under the present law because it is difficult to have a debtor
adjudicated a bankrupt without his consent. The provisions in
the proposed laws which would increase the number of involuntary bankruptcies would create this new class of debtors on
probation.
The creation of this class of debtors would not appear to
be deliberate. Yet one may ask whether it is in the public
interest. Policing debtors who have received discharges in
the recent past would not appear necessary to the preservation of credit in view of the absence of policing and rather
high availability of credit under current law. It may enhance
the productivity of some while it would decrease the productivity of others. Ordinarily such policing would have a serious
adverse impact on the human dignity of the debtor. A principal means of avoiding creation of a class of debtors on probation would be adoption of the earlier suggestion that those
with regular income be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy.
Discharge and the Great Game
A series of provisions in the Commission bill related to
discharge would affect the conduct of that great game played
by the debtor and his creditors. Creditors have often employed
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the allegation of a false financial statement as an important
move in that game. Under section 17(a)(2) of the present law
a debt for "obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing" concerning
the debtor's financial condition is not dischargeable.' 49 Creditors may either challenge the dischargeability of a debt under
section 17(c)(2) or settle with the debtor in exchange for a
reaffirmation of the debt. When the debt is secured by property
which the bankrupt wants to retain, both debtor and creditor
would achieve their respective goals of retaining property and
bringing the debt through bankruptcy by means of the reaffirmation. The Commission made a statement concerning this
portion of the great game which is worth reproducing at length.
It reads as follows:
In 1970, Congress became convinced that the discharge obtained by a bankrupt was often frustrated by
creditors who had taken a financial statement listing the
bankrupt's debts at the time that credit was extended. If
the bankrupt made less than a complete disclosure of all
his debts in the statement, the creditor could, prior to
1971, sue the discharged debtor on the debt arising out of
the loan or other extension of credit by relying on an exception in the section defining the scope of the discharge. The
exception was for any debt arising out of an extension of
credit by a creditor who relied on a false financial statement, but Congress was informed that often the false financial statement was not relied on by the creditor, that
indeed it was often obtained merely for the purpose of
being used as a basis for negotiation for a reaffirmation
after bankruptcy or for obtaining a default judgment
against a debtor unwilling to reaffirm.
Congress by the amendment of 1970 to section 17 of
the present Act required creditors wishing to rely on this
and certain other exceptions from discharge to seek a determination of the issue of dischargeability before the
bankruptcy court within a time prescribed by the bankruptcy court. The Commission has been informed that the
legislation has achieved its objective in part, but creditors
continue to make advantageous use of the financial statements obtained at the time of extending credit by filing or
threatening to file applications for determination of nondischargeability against bankrupts and accepting a reaffir149.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 17(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970).
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mation in settlement of the litigation or threatened litigation." 0
In view of the continuation of this problem despite the
attempt by Congress to control it, the Commission proposed
that "the use of a false financial statement be eliminated as a
basis for an exception to discharge for a consumer debt."'' 1 In
section 4-506(2) the Commission stated that proposal in statutory language.
150. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 10-11.
151. Id. at 12. It is also interesting to note the testimony of Los Angeles attorney
Bernard Shapiro, before the House: "This has caused considerable debate and controversy; it is, to some, a serious moral issue. I think to all it is a moral issue, yet, there
has been such abuse concerning consumer false financial statements and so much
vexing litigation over it, and it consumes so much time in the bankruptcy courts, that
the Commission felt it should be eliminated as a ground for nondischargeability in
consumer cases." House Hearings, supra note 5, at 973.
The Bankruptcy Commission, in its prepared statement before the Senate Hearings stated: "It has been alleged and believed by many that the principal function of
a false financial statement is to provide the lender with a weapon or lever to enforce
collection after a discharge, typically by obtaining a default judgment, or to coerce
reaffirmation of a discharged debt." Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 9.
The Commission's proposal, however, is not universally accepted. Also speaking
at the Senate Hearings, Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr, (on behalf of the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges) testified that the Commission's proposal "is not in
accord with the standards which prevail in the credit marketplace," and represents a
"retreat from the commitment of assuring ready access to a fair and impartial judicial
forum for consumer credit grantors and borrowers alike." Id. at 62. Opponents to the
Commission proposal generally express concern that dishonest debtors may willfully
make a false financial statement but nonetheless be discharged from the debt. See,
e.g., id. at 129 (statement of Walter C. Vaughn, American Bankers Ass'n & Consumers
Bankers Ass'n); id. at 143-44 (statement of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Law Forum of the Nat'l Consumer Fin. Ass'n); id.
at 196-97 (statement of Linn K. Twinem, Beneficial Fin. System).
Mr. Twinem's testimony indicated that creditors generally believe that the 1970
amendments offer debtors adequate protection with regard to false financial statements. Under those amendments a bankruptcy judge must determine: (1) whether the
statement is materially false; (2) whether the statement was made with the intent to
deceive; and (3) whether the creditor relied upon the statement. Id. at 196.
The Bankruptcy Commission and the National Consumer Law Center, however,
both disagreed with this creditor argument. Professor Richard A. Hesse, consultant to
the National Law Center, described an informal survey conducted by the National
Consumer Law Center of legal service attorneys that involved over 3,000 cases since
the implementation of the 1970 amendments. The survey disclosed that false financial
statement problems still occur in 14% of the cases. Id. at 328. Professor Hesse goes on
to say that
[T]he same problems to which the 1970 amendments presented themselves are still present; that is, the debtor is encouraged not to list everything on the financial statement, and the bankruptcy court is willing to
draw the conclusion that the failure to list other creditors on the financial
statement was done with the intent to deceive.
Id. at 328.
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The Commission also included several provisions regulating the great game. One has not been discussed. Under section
4-506(b), which in some respects resembles the present section
17(c)(1), either the debtor or a creditor may request the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of a debt. The
concluding sentence of this subsection would bring a portion of
the great game under public scrutiny. It reads as follows: "An
agreement entered in good faith and approved by the court
settling litigation to determine the dischargeability of a debt
may be enforced against the debtor.""'
The related provision in section 4-504(b) which allows enforcement of an agreement to redeem property was discussed
earlier. The rule in section 4-507 prohibiting a reaffirmation of
debts provides an exception for section 4-504(b) and section 4506(b) agreements.
Neither the House nor the Senate version adopts the Commission's proposal regarding false financial statements. Both
contain an exception to discharge resembling very closely the
provision of the present law found in section 17(a)(2). In section
523(a)(2)(B) of the House version a discharge does not cover a
debt
for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension or
renewal of credit by . . . use of a statement in writing (i)
that is materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor's financial condition; (iii) on which the creditor to whom the
debtor is liable for obtaining such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and (iv) that the debtor
made or published with intent to deceive.'53
That provision presents a formidable list of obstacles to a creditor using it as a basis for objecting to discharge of the debt owed
to him. However, a similar set of obstacles appears in the
present law and does not deter creditors who, as the Commission noted, would continue to harass debtors seeking the relief
of bankruptcy with charges of false financial statements. Arguably, debtors in bankruptcy are less well represented than
creditors and are not prepared to meet these allegations. The
House version in section 523(d) directs the court to "award to
the debtor the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the
proceeding to determine dischargebility" when it decides in a
consumer-debtor's favor on a false financial statement allega152.
153.

Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-506(b).
House Bill, supra note 6, § 523(a)(2)(B).
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tion.' 54 The court would also award the debtor any damages
resulting from the proceeding. The Senate version would permit attorney's fees only when the court found that "the proceeding was frivolous and not brought by the creditors in good
faith."' 55 The prospective attorney's fees would give debtors'
counsel an incentive to contest these challenges to dischargeability more vigorously. Whether creditors would be deterred
from routinely alleging a false financial statement would depend on how vigorously debtors' attorneys respond. The House
version contains in section 524(c)(1)'56 the provision for settlement of litigation concerning dischargeability which was noted
in the Commission bill. In view of the provision for attorney's
fees' 57 one must ask whether such a settlement could include a
fee for the debtor's attorney. If such a fee becomes a routine
part of settlement agreements, the debtor's attorney would
always have an incentive to settle rather than contest the creditor's challenge to dischargeability at the risk of losing his fee.
In that event creditors would continue to routinely allege false
financial statements.
As noted earlier, the Senate version contains a general
permission to revive or reaffirm debts. Thus, it does not need
a separate provision for revival in settlement of an objection to
discharge. The principal check on revival is found in section
524(b) which permits a debtor to rescind or reaffirm within
thirty days. When the debtor is represented by an attorney
whose fee may be related to the revival or reaffirmation in
settlement of or an objection to discharge, one may question
whether he will advise the debtor to rescind within thirty days.
The Commission bill in section 4-506(a)(3) excepts from
discharge any debt incurred within ninety days before bankruptcy "without the intention.

. .

to pay the debt and in con-

templation of the filing of a petition."' 58 The House version
154. Id. § 523(d).
155. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 523(d).
156. Since the Senate bill allows for revival and reaffirmation, id. § 524(b),
section 524(c)(1) of the House version became unnecessary and was not carried over.
157. House Bill, supra note 6, § 523(d).
158. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-506(a)(3).
Both bills cover the question of "loading up," that is the practice of
certain debtors of running up substantial debts in the period immediately
prior to the filing of the petition at a time when they were so hopelessly
insolvent that it is obvious there was no ability or intent to repay. There
has been an attempt made in both bills to meet this problem, by providing that debts incurred within ninety days of filing without intention to
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does not contain a similar provision. Arguably, the provision in
the Commission bill was an exchange for agreement on abolishing the false financial statement exception to discharge in consumer cases. When this exception was restored in the House
version there no longer was a need for the exchange.
If one leaves aside this compromise found in section 4506(a)(3), the Commission's elimination in consumer cases of
the false financial statement exception to discharge is preferable from the consumer's view to the related provisions of the
House and Senate versions. Arguably, neither the false financial statement exception nor the provision in section 4506(a)(3) is necessary to protect creditors in consumer cases.
Alert use of modern credit checking should prevent most flagrant abuses of credit by consumers. Those who extend credit
as part of their business can easily absorb the odd occasional
instance of flagrant abuse which escapes normal precautions.
Creditors can determine whether it is in their interest to
tighten credit checking to reduce minor abuses. If these provisions are not necessary to protect creditors then their elimination would have no significant impact on the availability or
cost of credit.
Retaining either the false financial statement exception,
as the House and Senate versions do, or the provision found in
section 4-506(a)(3) of the Commission bill would adversely affect other public interests. Both provisions interfere with the
debtor's rehabilitation by burdening him with debts after
bankruptcy. Rehabilitation of debtors is a purpose of modern
bankruptcy supported by the public interest in promoting the
productivity of economic units and preserving human dignity.
In view of the long continued abuse by creditors of the false
financial statement exception in consumer cases it would make
sense to eliminate this exception to discharge and leave creditors to the other resources and tools noted above to protect
against abuse of consumer credit. To continue the false financial statement exception would be to continue a sporting theory
of discharge, that is, to allow the creditors a fair chance tO
catch their quarry before letting him escape forever. The image
of the great game may provide insight into how bankruptcy is
repay and in contemplation of the filing can be excepted from the discharge. It is our [American Bankers Association] belief that this attempt
has been rendered almost completely ineffectual by the requirement of a
showing of intent to file a bankruptcy proceding [sic].
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1026 (statement of Walter W. Vaughn).
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actually played but it is not in the public interest to concentrate on promoting the sporting aspects of bankruptcy.
Some may contend that the false financial statement exception should be continued for the purpose of punishing debtors who employ such statements or to deter others from using
them. 5' The deterrent effect is probably nonexistent; very few
debtors, particularly consumer-debtors, would be aware of this
provision of bankruptcy law at the relevant moment for deterrence. It is not in the public interest to use bankruptcy as a
punitive law. If any law should serve that function it should be
the criminal law. Bankruptcy should promote human dignity,
the productivity of economic units and the proper functioning
of the credit system.'10 For these reasons, the Commision's position in regard to
the false financial statement exception to discharge should be
adopted without its provision in section 4-506(a)(3). If the position found in the House version prevails, some care should be
taken regarding attorney's fees in agreements settling litigation
concerning discharge. If there is a greater incentive to settle
than litigate, the provision of attorney's fees for successful litigation would not reduce creditor abuse of the false financial
statement exception to discharge. Continuation of these abuses
after enactment of the House version should provide a basis for
future change in its discharge provisions.
CONCLUSION

Hopefully the reader has seen a portrait emerging during
this article of a new bankruptcy law now being born through
the law-making process whose characteristic features are becoming fixed. The final moments of birth may be imminent,
or hopefully, in the interest of consumer-debtors or for other
purposes, may be postponed. Our vision of the choices available in the enacting process is still fresh. At this vantage point
in time one can review the likely provisions of the new law and
compare the choices taken with those not taken. Perhaps one
can locate provisions worth watching to see how they work in
practice. The provisions selected for comment in this article are
those which affect consumer-debtors. Arguably these provi159. See id. at 898-902 (statement of Linn K. Twinem).
160. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 865 (testimony of Samuel J.M. Donnelly). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 315, 329-30 (testimony of Richard
A. Hesse).
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sions are among those most worth watching. Since consumerdebtors were the least able to protect their interests in the
enactment process, the provisions affecting them may be
among those producing intriguing results which should be followed with close scrutiny accompanied by empirical research.
A methodology has been offered for locating and evaluating the provisions which would most seriously affect the interests of consumer-debtors and which would determine for them
"
the characteristic features of the new law. ' One should examine the provisions in any proposal which are related to the
structural features of modern bankruptcy law to determine how
the suggested provisions would affect the consumer-debtor's
ability to avoid bankruptcy or to choose the appropriate form
of proceeding voluntarily, to bring a reasonable amount of
property through bankruptcy, and to obtain a discharge covering most of his debts. Arguably, provisions are peripheral
which are not related to these fundamental concerns which the
structure of bankruptcy law creates for the consumer-debtor.
When one has described the impact of a provision on the basic
interests of a consumer-debtor, one can then evaluate it in view
of the public interest. "' By using this methodology, one can
assess the impact of the proposal on the twin purposes of modern bankruptcy law, to rehabilitate the debtor and to provide
an orderly process for collection and distribution of his estate,
and on the more fundamental national concerns which logically
support these purposes. Arguably, the fundamental national
interests which support a bankruptcy law are concern for the
preservation of credit, for promotion of human dignity and for
increasing the productivity of economic units.
Using this method, we have found in the Commission bill
and in the House and Senate versions a number of provisions,
sometimes in alternate form, which would promote or detract
from the interests of consumer-debtors.
One set of provisions, including some discussed under discharge, relate to the initiation and choice of bankruptcy proceedings.'6 3 There appears to be a trend towards increasing the
161. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
162. Compare the purpose behind analyzing the impacts of the proposed bankruptcy laws on the consumer-debtoras the "least advantaged class," with the discussion of the difference principle in J. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 75.
163. See Commission Bill, supra note 6, §§ 4-201, 4-204, 4-205, 4-505(7); House
Bill, supra note 6, §§ 301, 302, 303, 305, 727(a)(8). See also notes 25-47, 144-145 and
accompanying text supra.
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number of involuntary bankruptcies for consumer-debtors,
hindering voluntary bankruptcy, and emphasizing wage earners' proceedings either as a substitute for voluntary or as an
escape from involuntary bankruptcy.
All three proposed bills make it easier for a creditor to have
a debtor adjudicated a bankrupt without his consent. The
Commission bill offers a creditor a range of incentives for employing an involuntary petition. Among these are the ability to
reach assets exempt under state law but not in bankruptcy
(particularly in states with large homestead exemptions), 6 , to
collect during the five year period following a bankruptcy any
nonexempt property without allowing the debtor a discharge
unless he converts to a wage earners' proceeding," 5 and to
forcefully persuade a debtor to initiate a wage earners' proceeding which would give the creditors access to future income in
an amount larger than permitted by the garnishment laws of
many states.' 6 An important provision in the House version
allows the debtor to choose the state exemptions rather than
the uniform exemptions in the bankruptcy law.' 67 This removes
some incentives for using involuntary petitions. Such incentives are also removed by the Senate's elimination of federal
exemptions. In states whose homestead exemptions equal or
are less than the federal exemption ($10,000), creditors under
the House version may use bankruptcy as a device for collecting from debtors, such as the elderly, who have substantially
paid for homes. This incentive will be more generally present
if the Senate's removal of federal minimums is accepted. The
other incentives for filing an involuntary petition continue
under the House version and in some instances are stronger. A
debtor under the House version must wait six rather than five
years between discharges, which would increase the incentive
for using an involuntary petition in the interim.' 5 A creditor
filing an involuntary petition may be influenced by a number
of overlapping incentives. He may desire, for example, either
164. This would be the case where the state homestead exemption is greater than
$5,000. See Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(b)(1); notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
165. See Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-505(7).
166. See generally Commission Bill, supra note 6, ch. VI; notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
167. See House Bill, supra note 6, § 522(b)(2)(A); note 123 and accompanying
text supra.
168. See House Bill, supra note 6, § 727(a)(8); notes 145-148 and accompanying
text supra.
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an elderly person's home or access in substantial amounts to
that person's future income from a pension or other sources. It
would be harder for a creditor to thrust a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy under the House version than under the Commission bill. Nevertheless, it would often be easy for three institutional creditors to cooperate in the filing of involuntary petitions against pre-established types of consumer-debtors. Despite the higher debt required ($5,000) and the higher exemptions available, the incentive for filing involuntary petitions
would be present in many instances.
The probably proper elimination of the acts of bankruptcy
as the basis for an involuntary petition is the step which would
make possible the list of undesirable consequences just enumerated. The most effective tool for guarding against these
consequences would be an exemption from involuntary bankruptcy for those with regular income or, in the alternative, for
those who earn less than some specified amount such as $20,000
or $30,000. Arguably, this would continue the design of the
present law where the provision exempting wage earners with
9
incomes of $1,500 or less has become obsolete due to inflation.'
The Commission bill requires counseling concerning wage
earners' proceedings for those filing voluntary petitions. " " Despite the Commission's finding that the number of voluntary
petitions is not excessive, the House and Senate versions place
a more substantial obstacle before those seeking voluntary relief. The bankruptcy judge has the power to abstain in a voluntary or involuntary proceeding unless the bankruptcy would be
in the better interest of the debtor and his creditors.' 7 ' Unless
the judge's power to abstain is restricted to involuntary bankruptcies, consumer-debtors would be deprived of the free access to relief from debts which has been available since 1898.
In view of the Commission's finding, restriction of that free
access would not appear necessary to the preservation of credit
and would often reduce productivity by compelling a debtor to
struggle with the weight of his debts either privately or through
a wage earners' proceeding. Arguably, free access to relief from
debts is important for the preservation of human dignity.
169. The Senate insertion of the words "major portion" in the insolvency test of
section 303(h)(1) would contribute to controlling these undesirable consequences.
170. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-203(a); see notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
171. House Bill, supra note 5, § 305(a)(1); see notes 41-46 and accompanying text
supra.
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The provisions which encourage involuntary while restricting voluntary bankruptcy fit into a pattern in which there is
an emphasis upon wage earners' proceedings and upon the financial counseling and education of consumer-debtors. Involuntary bankruptcy would provide the leverage to encourage
debtors to file petitions in wage earners' proceedings. Debtors
would be persuaded or compelled to use wage earners' proceedings when they seek voluntary relief. While it is desirable to
make these proceedings more attractive and useful to debtors,
it would seem overly paternalistic to compel debtors by the
pressures described in this article to file petitions in wage earners' proceedings. Unless Congress intends to have a very substantial number of debtors (perhaps 750,000 during any given
year) under the supervision of the federal bankruptcy courts,
consumer-debtors should be allowed to file voluntary petitions
without hindrance and should be exempt from involuntary
bankruptcy.
There are provisions attractive to consumers in both the
Commission bill and the House version. A number of these
relate to the great game in which debtors seek to preserve property while obtaining a discharge and creditors seek either payment or the survival of debts despite the discharge. 7 ' The increased attractiveness of wage earners' proceedings would
allow some consumers to arrange their affairs sensibly. Hopefully consumers would not have to pay the price just described
in exchange for this improvement. Both the House version and
the Commission bill bring the problem of reaffirmations and
agreements settling objections to the dischargeability of debts
under public scrutiny.' The Senate version contains an in1' Credtriguing but perhaps ineffective provision on this point. 74
itors, however, achieved a significant victory when the drafters
of the House version were persuaded to restore the false financial statement exception to discharge of a consumer debt.'75
This victory could provide a basis for substantial interference
with the rehabilitation of debtors, especially if debtors' attor172. See Commission Bill, supra note 6, §§ 4-403(b)(8), 4-503, 4-506, 4-507(a);
House Bill, supra note 6, §§ 522, 523. See also notes 144-160 and accompanying text
supra.
173. See Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-507(a); House Bill, supra note 6, 99
524(b), 722. See also notes 92-106 and accompanying text supra.
174. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 524(b).
175. See House Bill, supra note 6, § 523(a)(2)(B); text accompanying note 153
supra.
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neys have an incentive to settle disputes concerning dischargeability. The Commission's position on false financial state"' in consumer transactions should be accepted. If crediments 76
tor pressure forces rejection of the exception for consumer debts
from this bar to dischargeability, then debtors' attorneys
should not receive a fee in settlement agreements but should
be compensated for successful litigation of dischargeability.
A number of other provisions favorable to consumerdebtors were discussed. For example, the exemption provisions
in the House version are a substantial improvement from the
consumer's view over those in the Commission bill.' 77 The exemption provisions and others affect the basic interests of the
consumer-debtor. Some provisions favorable to the consumer
78
such as the unconscionability sections of the Commission bill'
do not seriously affect these basic interests and could be described as window dressing.
The House version, which has been highly influenced by
the continuing concern and effort of California Congressman
Don Edwards, will probably become law, hopefully with some
of the changes recommended in this article and some of the
better provisions found in the Senate version. Such continuing
dedication to revision of a major segment of federal law deserves the type of scrutiny which law reviews provide for important court decisions. The impact of important legislation
should be reviewed during the enactment process for the purpose of evaluating its provisions, suggesting changes in them,
and providing a basis for a post-enactment audit. If experience
shows that some provisions produce undesirable results, further change should follow. Hopefully, those concerned with
protecting consumer-debtors will follow, as well as predict, the
impact on consumer interests of the structural provisions of the
emerging bankruptcy law and will urge the necessary changes
on Congress.
176. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 123-142 and accompanying text supra.Compare House Bill, supra
note 6, § 522(b)(2)(A), (d)(1)-(12) with Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-503(b)(1),
(c)(04-9).
178. Commission Bill, supra note 6, § 4-403(b)(8), (c); see notes 106-113 and
accompanying text supra.

